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ABSTRACT
& case analysis was conducted on the leadership at Prime Computer,
Inc. Specifically, the President and Chief Executive Officer, Mr, Ken
Fisher, was studied. Data was obtained primarily through interviews
with Mr. Fisher, and with his executive vice-presidents.
Prime Computer was initially cnosen because it was a firm in
wnich the leader appeared to make a definite impact. This analysis
attempts to explain wny r. risher's behavior was successtui. It
addresses leadership action or behavior rather than leadership style
alone. Primary theorists employed are Fiedler, Hollander, Argyris,
Quinn, awrence and Lorsch, and Beckhard. The pri-mary leadership
models that are explored are the tontingency Mbodel of eadership,
situational and trait models, and the social exchange theory of
leadership.
Issues particularly relevant in leadership study are also
explored. These are: strategy formation, decision-making,
and management of change.
Application of the literature to this case reveals areas in
which there is little or no research to exrain elements of the
leadership phenomenon. The teories that appear to explain
leadership action most definitively appear to be Hollander's
situational theory of leadership, which addresses follower influence
during the emergence of leadership; and Social Exchange Theory,
attributed to several theorists, which implies an exchange of
rewards and costs in the leadership process.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph Katz
Title: Senior Lecturer
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Introduction
This paper is the result of a case analysis of the leadership
at Prime Computer. Specifically, it addresses several issues in
leadership that the President and C.E.O., Mro Kenneth Fisher,
confronted at Prime.
Prime was initially chosen because it is a relatively new corporation,
and one in which it seems the leader made a definite impact. It would
seem that a new corporation would be more conducive to study than an
older, more complex one, in which the imDact of a leader s affected
by many more variables. It is hoped that as a result of this analysis,
a more insightful understanding of leadership action will be gained.
This brings up several issues. Can a study be meaningful if it
only looks at one leader in a company? Will the analysis of the data
be relevant to other situations? The author feels that these are
obvious questions, but that they both have a "yes" answer. The study
is based on several issues that are commnon for most leaders in
corporations, although of course, there will be situational differences.
The primary urpose of this study, however, is to develop more insight
into leadership action, instead of just leadership style. It is felt
that an in-depth study will be more advantageous than studying several
leaders for this end.
Jay Galbraith talks about leadership in the following.
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Leadership is a subject for which there is a great deal
of folklore, theoretical seculation, and even empirical
evidence. But in spite of this attention, there is no
single, valid theory of leadership. One can find classic
works in organization theory which consider leadership
to be the critical factor around which the organization
should be designed. In another, the word leadership is
not even mentioned. Among these theorists who consider
leadership important, one can find several different
paradigms. Research within a single paradigm often
shows inconsistent results and rrely if ever is more
than 25 percent of the variance of a behavior or
attitude explained. Thus, leadership is reearded by
some as one of the most important but least understood
factors in organization. 1
This study is based on the premise that leadership is one of the
most important factors in an organization, and on the assumption that
the leader him or herself makes the most significant impact on the
organization, provided environmental factors are not extreme or over-
whelming.
The data for this analysis was gathered mainly through personal
interviews with the CEO and President of Prime Computer, and several
of the executive Vice-Presidents. Those interviewed were: Mr. Kenneth
Fisher, President and CEO; Mro Joseph Cashen, v.P. Engineering and
Founder; Mr Robert Berkowitz, V.P. Manufacturing and Founder; Mr.
Dave Horton, V.P. Corporate Development; and Mro Don Jacobs, V.P.
Human Resources. Other sources used ae current literature regarding
Prime.
The primary theories that this study uses are nmely those of
Argyris, Quin, Hollander, Bass, Lawrence, Lorsch, Fiedler, and
Beckhard. Several studies conducted by the American Association of
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Management are also employed.
The issues that have been particularly identified in this study
of Prime's leadership (Ken Fisher) are the Following:
oPersonal philosophy of style of leadership
.Action of the leader in setting strategy
.Action of the leader in decision-making
.Action of the leader in an organization
undergoing chnge (technical orientation
to marketing orientation; rapid rowth in
personnel).
.Interaction of leader with and influence on
the executive team.
.Leader's role in defining a reward system.
.Non-engineer as a leader in a high-tech firm.
These issues can be combined into three overall areas of leadership
study, and will provide the framework of the theory and analysis.
These are: 
I. Leadership Philosophy and Behavior
II. Strategy Formulation and Decision-Making
III. Management of Change
First, however, data from the interviews and current literature
will be presented.
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II. DATA
Prime Computer, Inc , manufactures small to medium scale computer
systems for data acquisition, business data processing, and computation.
It was founded in 1972 when seven executives of Honeywell, Inc. decided
to start their own company. Honeywell had just gotten out of the mini-
computer market. These seven developed the first mini computer with many
of the capabilities found in larger mainframes. The basis of the
development as a high performance technology called MfJLTICS, developed
10 years prior at M.I.T. This technology had never been applied to
small computers.
Through 1974, the company was not profitable. The computer could
not be priced low enough to battle the existing competition.
Since that time, however, both sales and earnings skyrocketed.
For instance, sales increased from S11 million to 153 million over
a five-year period, starting in 1975, the time of Fisher's arrival.
These increases represent about a doubling of the previous ear's sales.
Profits also doubled every year in the same time period, from $692,0
in 1975 to $17 million in 1979.
F!SHPR
Mro Ken Fisher was named President and Chief Executive Officer in
July, 1975, after being recruited from Honeywell. At oneywell, he had
been Vice President of Central Operations for 3 years; Director of
Field arketing for 1 year, and had been associated with General Electric
for 10 years prior to 1970.
INIIAL CANGFlS
When Fisher came in 1975, Prime, like other minicomputer manufacturers,
had been selling to the large original equipment manufacturers (OEM). OEM's
integrated computers into their overall systems. Fisher came in and added
peripheral equipment to make Prime's product, instead, complete systems
for end users.
Prime became profitable because for the first time, it found customers
who were willing to pay for the quality and performance of the computer.
Principal buyers were the scientific and engineering customers, who were
sophisticated users, but small enough so that they could be motivated
by cost advantages over bigger mainframes.
After exploiting the inherent capability of the product by expanding
the markets, Fisher increased the sales force dramatically. He allocated
28% of revenue into marketing and sales, this percentage matched only
by I.B.M. Five subsidiaries were added ih Western Europe and seventeen
distributors around the world. oreign sales have since grown to be
over 40/ of sales.
INTERVIrW DATA A CRENT LITEPTLr
Ken isher came to Prime as a result of te Board of Directors and
several within the company clearly recognizing the need for a stronger
marketing organization. Prime, founded by engineers, had potential in
untapped markets. Some present executives said several had been aware
of this potential. e commented, however, " the need was identified,
but no one was doing anything about it. No one had what Ken Fisher
did...he was able to harness it..." Another senior executive commented
that it vas obvious that "Ken saw the marketing potential before he
came, just as soon as he interviewed." The Board of Directors felt
that Ken Fisher, with his extensive marketing background, could
immediately provide a marketing direction for Prime.
One executive pointed out the multiplicity of markets and applications
that the Prime product lent itself to, "so much so, that without major
investment in R&D, it was possible to broaden application use." 
One of the "first things" Ken Fisher did as to "ignore the OEM market"
for the most part, and concentrate on end users. For the next three
years, Fisher difected Prime to continue to focus on the end users.
In 1979, Prime began to address the OEM market it had ignored before,
but retained its primary focus on the end users. While Prime's major
competitors still sell primarily to the OEM market, Prime sells only
about 15% to the OEM market. Since then, Fisher's most recent marketing
strategic change was the decision to spend a considerable amount of
R&D on products for the "innovators", basically, for executives in
the "Office of the Future" market9 While IBM and Wang addressed
themselves primarily to secretaries in this mark.et, Fisher decided to
go all out by targeting executives. Une industry commentator
noted that while tis may hurt Prime in the short run, it will position
them well in the long run.2 One executive pointed out ho.- Fisher
'fine-tuned" te company's marketing orientation by making it mrlket-
driven as opposed to product-driven.
In addition to developing a marketing strategy, Fisher orchestrated
several tactical decisions. The V.P. of arketing was rerlaced; many
more marketing anH sales people were hired, proportional to other
functional areaso hen Fisher arrived at Prime, there were only about.
100 employees, only a few of those in marketing. As the number of
employees has grown to over a few thousand, over of these are in
marketing. One industry spokesman noted: "Prime matched IBM,
putting a huge 28%. of revenue in marketing..." He noted that perhaps
the greatest testimony to Fisher's strategy was that small computer
systems were recently introduced by rivals IBM, DEC, DG and HP,
more competitive in price and performance than previously.
When Fisher focused the company on the "innovators" and "early
adoptors" in the market place, he did this because he felt that 85'
of the marketplace comes to us for free". He explained how he decided
.o focus Prime on the 15% of te market representing the 2.5%
innovators and 13o5% early adopters. These are the markets that isher
felt that money should be devoted to. He discredited the idea that a
lot of money should be spent on extending the product life cycle.
Fisher contended that this strategy might not be as relevant and
successful for another company, howevero
When the executives of Prime were asked whether they thought a
transition to a marketing-oriented company would have happened
"anyway", i.eo, as a result of the inherent capability of the product,
one executive said that "eventually the potential of the product would
have surfaced, but certainly, not as uickly or as fully as it did
vid-a-vis Ken's drive0" Another executive's words summarized the
general feeling: "Another CrO could have been marketing-oriented,
but another person may not have had the very aggressive ush for growth
that Fisher had." Fisher pointed cut that the company was very repdy
-1for change but e did-intervene tosne e cnge2-
for change, but he did -intervene to shane the change.
Fisher set the stage for implementation of the changes he brought
about. He pointed out that the men with whom he would be working
closely were already "senior" people.A few came directly from Honeywell,
and were past associates of Fisher. While the V.P. of anufacturing
and the V.P. of Engineering were two of the original seven founders of
the company, the other senior executives came from jobs that were "as
big or bigger" than the ones they assumed at Prime. This was thought
to be a conscious decision on the part of Mr. Fisher. Manufacturing
and engineering were strong hen Fisher came; he built up Finance and
Marketing "from the ground", as one executive said. One executive
also credited Fisher with building one of the finest sales
systems in the world.
In trying to change the direction of Prime, Fisher noted that it
was important to adapt to the people already at Prime, in understanding
their concerns. At the same time, he took an active tole in getting
across his ideas for the company. One executive said "He used words
we didn't use before." Another one said that Mr. Fisher initially
spent a great deal of time explaining his ideas for a new marketing
strategy both to the Board of Directors and the executives.
One executive snoke about Fisher's major actions in orchestreting
the transition to a marketin-oriented company as taking advantage
of the "strengths" of the company, which were the potential new
markets; and, maintaining an 'unswerving committment" to profit.
This decision enab led Prime to fund growth internally, and to embark
on office of the future investment. Business Veek noted these
X
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achievementss "He dealt successfully ith the twin problems--financing
and managing growth--that hve all but crippled many pf the second-tier
minicomputer makers."4 An article described how in 1979 after a
S20 million convertible debenture offering, Prime claimed that it
would be able to continue to finance growth with ongoing profits, and
cash flow generated by an unusual system for deferred tax credits.
(Prime sells long-term full-payment leases to either Citibank or
Chase Manhattan, getting cash within 10 dayso For bank purposes, it's
an immediate sale, but for tax purposes, it's carried out over 5 years).
Fisher attributes the creative financing that Prime engaged in to Prime's
Chief Financial Officer.
One executive explained that Fisher was the kind of CEO that would
make aggressive decisions based on a finely tuned quarterly P&L state-
ment. He said Mro Fisher "acted" on these, meaning that the decisions,
with the associated risks, were based on the accuracy of such records,
and left little room for error. Profit funds the next opportunity, and
allows Fisher to take the next risk. One executive pointed out that
the growth in profits did not feel like an "even" ride up, but more
like a lot of sometimes painful "ups and downs" or "steps and starts"
brought about by the necessity of the departments tuning expense levels.
Another executive pointed out how this committment to profit was
evident within the marketing department itself. Salespeople at Prime
are actually "business representatives", making business decisions
for Prime. This represented a broader base of responsibility than
a strict marketing orientation; they incorporated an on-going concern
for profit as wello
Perhaps fundamental to understanding how the orientation of Prime
was chainged from a technologically driven to a market driven one,
is an understanding of the leadership style of Mr. Fisher, his method
of formulating strategy, and his actions as a decision-maker.
Mro Fisher has the image of a participative leader rather than an
autocratic one among his executives. He is seen as a leader who has
a definite vision for the company, and as one who s aggressive in
trying to make that vision a reality. He is perceived as a dominant person,
but not overwhelming. He is primarily seen to operate at the concertual
level; he "allows a lot of leeway", especially wdth the ideas senior
executives have. He is said not to tespond well to "I need.your help",
but responds rather to ideas that "bubble up". He is also thought
of as having less ego entrenchment than perhaps some Presidents of
other hi-tech fast-growing companies, allowing him to delegate
responsibility more so than his trying to control it all, Mr. Fisher
is thought of as setting the broader objectives for the company,
but it is up to the individual functional groups within the company to
interpret those objectives. Fisher may therefore npt become directly
involved in many major functional decisions, unless they cross functional
lines. A sense of teamwork also seems to emerge as an important bond
among the top executives which one executive described: "en doesn't
talk much about interpersonal teams as he does functional teams."
It is not really a place that looks for heroes, but good team players.
,One executive, who was one cf the origirnal founders of Prime, pointed
out that this teamwork was a necessary requirement under Fisher's
leadership, once Prime had evolved to a corporation from a sta'.rU-9..
He said that those whVo left were not comfortable making this transition,
thus, those that stayed were committed to this orientation, a kind of
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self-selecting processo He said that this required him to take a
totally different role from his entrepreneurial one. Interested and
stimulated by Fisher's style of leadership, he pointed out that Fisher
was the kind of leader that he could work with, and he allowed hm to
have complete control in interpretation of Fisher's strategies for
his functional area. Fisher's kind of leadership enabled him to make
his job '"bigger"; he could find the professional growth inherent in
the increasing responsibility still challenging. Another senior
executive-founder said that making the transition from an entrepreneurial
organization to a more formalized corporate structure as a nersonal and
professional experience was very "difficult", but one which was necessary
in order to be able to fulfill the responsibilities of a leader, as
opposed to an entrepreneur. He said that those that stayed at Prime
were both able and willing to make this transition, and that an
understanding of the sense of teamwork that is required in a middle to
large corporation was part of the"culture" established during the early
growth period of Prime under Fisher's leadershipo "An entrepreneurial
spirit doesn't describe what you want", this executive said, "not in
the usual meaning of the ord.What you want is someone (an executive)
who does have a sense of convention; a logical mind." He commented
that '"we often hear that many people will say that they don't want
'yes' men, but then won't tolerate anything but!" "Not that Prime
does not swant business professionals willing to take risks and deal
with issues, but the emphasis is on teamwork, and on a mode of
leadership by example and delegation." The objective, he pointed
out, is to enable top managers to lead; needing to be an entrepreneurial
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superstar could be seen to hinder the manaer's ability to truly lead.
Whereas a project manager or orker might be able to completely control
all the elements of that project, a leader in a corporation must be
willing to lead, or rather to manage people and have control through
people. This analogy between a project manager and a leader is the
one that Fisher uses also, to illustrate the difference between his
leadership as EO, and that of the former CEOo The second executive-
founder echoed the first's on explaining his reasons for staying at Prime.
He said that isher's style enabled autonomy and growth of those below
him, and that he felt he coul' assume an orinetation of leadership
made possible under Fisher, that of constantly adanting to different
situations. bThen asked about the motivation to stay in a company when
one was already well-compensated by the success of the stock, hp
said that for him, it wasn't like he made enouph money here, and now
it's time to try someplace else." He said his ability to respect Fisher's
leadership and perceive the continued challenge for himself motivated
him to stay. He pointed out that "the money is not so important as
enhancing the quality of your li'e."
This team approach strongly links the executives who stress that
consensus is the vehicle theyuse for decision-aking. Each functional
V.P. has the authority and responsibility for ultimate interpretation
of the basic decisions made by the group and by Fisher. One executive
pointed out that Fisher was known to force people to be independent; he
was not a "hend-holder'"o Functional decisions are the responsibility
of the functional leaders. The executive pointed out hot- this, in turn,
influenced each of the executives' style of leadership in that they
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pushed decision-making down as much as possible within the functional
group to te level of implementor.
Both Fisher and the V.P. involved most closely in making strategy
for the company expressed a strong committment to this functional
orientation. "The least number of contention points, the bette.r",
contends Fisher. The best organizational structure is the simplest,
he believes. When asked about the viability of such a structural
orientation as the company grows larger, he stated that one could
develop the "biggest organization with the simplest functional
organization". He stated there are "good reasons why integration is
difficult." Most business day-to-day decisions are made within the
functions, not across them. The bigger decisions are the ones that
do cross the functional areas, and have a bigger impact on the
corporation. These are the decisions in which Fisher said he is most
likely to become involved.
Fisher created a Corporate Development group, consisting of
4-5 people, of which there is a senior V.P. that reports directly to
Fisher, and whose office is even physically close to Fisher's. This
group was created partially to be able to play the role of integrator,
if a particular decision-making process across functions is not
productive. This executive pointed out that of course, most of the
cross-functional decisions occurred between marketing and engineering,
and that, as the company grew larger, these kinds of cross-functional
decisions were becoming more commonplace, and the efficiency of these
kinds of decisions was naturally being studied by the company. For
the most part, though, he said that the system was in place to support
two functional groups working it out themselves. One executive pointed
out that the functional organization was probably particularly workable
-at Prime was because of the nearly singular product line, as opposed
to being an extremely diversified company. Executives felt that the
common bond between all the functional groups were the internal
financial controls, and the strong commitment to rofit. All groups
said that they shared a marketing orientation also, and that, for
instance, it was noted that even in some of the lower levels in
engineering, people were seen to be more "sensitive to the market" than
might otherwise have been exoected.
Fisher says he is not an "}0O guy"o He believes that BO's
destroy integration, causing suboptimization. One of Fisher's
important roles is to be integrator of the functional groups, and inte-
gration in decision-making that involves the whole corporation.
He is not seen to make capricious changes, nor brash decisions, but
methodological ones. Even during Prime's period of highest growth, one
executive said that decisions were not made hurriedly, rather a kind
of "hastening slowly". It was also pointed out that after Ken and the
team might see things "early", and wouldn't necessarily act, There is
a willingness to develop strategies slowly, as long as the executives
feel they have all the necessary pieces.
As CEO, Fisher is described as wanting to "keep the engine
running well", but that he is most interested in results, and in moving
towards future results for that matter. He set up the Corporate
Development group to keep people "thinking strategically", recognizing
the fact that this is a continuous process. This is An effort that
is achieved by persuasion rather than command.
.1 9.
In formulating strategy for the company, Fisher said that when
he first came to Prime, people were devoting 90-95% of their energy
on the "how" question, without determining "what" the actual objectives
weret if they were that which they wanted to meet. He said that he tried
to get people to focus on the "what" and to show them that the "how"
will fall out naturally. He pointed out that this was a process
that had to be a conscious effort; it was not an obvious thing.
Fisher said that in formulating strategy for the company, it was important
that they look at where the company was right now, in addition to where
it wanted to go. As previously mentioned, Fisher orchestrated the
company's marketing orientation, and changed the marketing strategy itself.
One executive said that Fisher led the strategic process in a "realistic"
way, that is, he shaped the strategies to "fit" existing strengths of
the company (i.e., product technology, etc.). Fisher clarified what
the present company structure was, what should be preserved, and what
should change. One executive described this type of strategy as a
kind of "evolution" towards a future scenario that was easy
enough to imagine well "in advance". By building on what the company
actually has now, the company could find a balance between "evolution
and revolution", rather than an "operation, which requires a long
recovery."
As CEO of Prime, Fisher is seen to be, not only a company spokesman,
but a spokesman of the industry.One executive said that when Fisher
first came to Prime, "he talked more about the company0 Now he talks mpore
about the industry in general." Indeed, Fisher has been quoted in
several articles speaking about the "Office of the Future".
Fisher's executive team perceive him as a leader who determines what
1.
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Prime wants to pursue. Fisher establishes the objectives; it is up to
the executives to interpret these for each of the functional areas.
Fisher describes his view of leadership as similar to what his
executives perceive. He points out that te role of a leader becomes
what you make it, and that in a corporate hierarchy, a lot of uys
don't lead. "Leading is not caretaking, admninistrating. Leading is
setting priorities; deciding what's important; setting a frmew-ork;
defining a job.'t Fisher is clear in pointing out that he "doesn't
do all the work." He likes to draw the distinction between a corporate
leader, such as he is, and a project leader, in defining his role.
" A project leader is one who solves problems, gives answers to problems."
He explains that this is apt to be the kind of leader that does well
in a start-up situation. This is also perhaps the kind of leadership
that Prime had before he came, he pointed out. " A corporation leader,
a professional manager, on the other hnd, is one 7ho defines and
identifies these problems, before they get to the solution phase."
The difference between these types of leadership is perhaps only evident
to professional managers--Fisher id not think that those with "project
leader" orientations often saw the distinction. "An organization
needs something different as it goes trou;h different stages", and
that while leading it today is different than it was in 1975,
he admits, he contends that the style and framework are still the same.
Fisher claims this is the objective of te kind of leadership role
that a company requires: one that is broad enough so that it cn move
and lead an organization, rather than get bogged down in too many
tacticso Fisher points out that there are instances, no doubt,
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when a corporate leader is thrust into a dire situation, and must
straighten things out, but, generally, this is not the case. Fisher
feels that "leading by direction" prepares his executives to also lead
by direction, as opposed to leading by doing.
One executive said that Fisher also knows hen "not to lead".
tie said that he "gives leadership when other people demand it, but he
knows that to control management, one must let management manage."
When each of the senior executives was asked what thev felt was
Ken Fisher's single most important contribution, two said his aggressive
marketing thrust; one said his marketing strength and his unswerving
committment to profits; and one said his facility for allowing the
company to "boil and bubble", and to let decisions get made as low as
possible--to let the organization run itself as much as possible.
Fisher felt that his single most important contribution has been his
"ability to manage eople". ne implies that he is able to allow others
to assume as much responsibility as they can, not needing to come
across as domineering or authoritative He said trying to understand
people is a priority. he is quick to point out that another in his
position might lead in a much more autocratic fashion, but that that
was not his particular style of leadership. hen asked if he tried
to change his style to fit the environment at Prime or if he tried to
change the environment to fit his leadership style, he said, "a little
of both." me said, though, that a lot of hat as recuired of a
leader was to do more of the latter; "that's what you do". Fisher
also feels he has been successful in his ability to integrate
the functional areaso While he believes in a simple organizational
structure, he also believes in a"simple" leadership style. e said
_22-
he is not a "harried executive", that he had a clear enough understanding
of the needs of the job that he was able to set riorities, and devote
his time to the most important issues.
Fisher stated that one of his important tasks when he first came
to Prime was to get people ready to lead in a different fashion,
He set up a structure that he hoped ould prepare his team of executives
to lead by "direction", rather than by "doing". He pointed out that
there has been very little turnover in top management, and that was
"good". He said an important plus for his organization is and rill be
a stable management team that can grow with the organization, without
having to change the team a lot. As was pointed out before, the executives
that Fisher brought in all had "bigger" jobs prior to coming to Prime.
This meant, he said, that they were ready for their responsibilities,
and that they were able to "grow the company to where they's already
been9 " Although the executives had all had "bigger" jobs before, as
one executive pointed out, "none of us have ever been wvhere we are
before tist" meaning, the top executives of a growing corporation.
As a result, he said tey all take teir jobs very seriously--they
have a bigger stake in Prime. This executive said that, as a result of
this comrmittment from the executives, coupled with the fact that they
each have depth in managerial experience, that Prime has a highly
sophisticated management team, "one of the most sophisticated" he'd
seen.
Fisher clearly states that much of Prime's success has been due to
those who work for him. For instance, he attributed the creative
financing that has taken place at Prime to the Chief Financial Officer.
-'3-
What he does say is that he has been successful in integrating the
functional teams, and in managing in such a way that allows his
executives. and other to continually expand the scopes of their own jobs.
Fisher states that Prime's mission is to make money for the share-
holders. He does not believe in a r.iche orientation; this is confining,
He believes that Prime is wanted in many places, so .there is no reason
to find a 'niche". Have to think as if there is unlimited demand."
As a professional manager, Fisher is somewhat unusual in his role
as CEO and President of a growing computer corporation, as most others
who hold this position are engineers. However, neither Fisher nor
his executives feel that this has been detrimental in any
way. They feel that Fisher's marketing orientation was important to
the company, especially hen manufacturing and engineering were Already
strong at Prime. Besides, one executive pointed out although Ken
Fisher may not know some very detailed aspects of production, as an
example, he was actually very competent in his understanding of the
technical elements of the business end the needs and oprortunities
in the market based on this knowledge. There is an obvious committment
to "know" the product and the markets.
Fisher is a leader who establishes the broad objectives for the
company; he is the one with a vision, not only for the company, but
for the industry. As one executive pointed out, " he is committed
to staying at the conceptual level..ohe has a very clear idea of what
leading is all about. He is very consistent about this." While most
found this style to enable them to grow and be challenged in their
jobs, the executive pointed out that there were, no doubt, some who would
rather be told what to do, to be led in a very directive wayo Fisher
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explained that although he does not get directly involved in many day-
to-day functional decisions, he does have a way of knowing if decisions
are being made° If he is involved in too many functional decisions, he
knows that the functional leader is not assuming full responsibility
for his area. This, he said, is a potential indicator of a need to
replace that person. If this were the case, Fisher said that his style
was also to be confrontative, and to act quickly and clearly in such a
situation.
When asked what he thought kept people at Prime, especially those
executives that have already been well-compensated, he said he felt
that the fact that the executives could still find their jobs retarding
and challenging; and that he personally tr-ed not to limit their growth
or desire/capacity for more responsibility. For the company as a -:hole,
he said he felt that stock options were a ey compensation tool, a kind
of a thread that runs through the entire company.
Fisher is a CEO who thinks that his executives work effectively
and smoothly as a team; he feels that each one has complementary
strengths. He said that he tries to relate to all levels in the
organization, even if just through casual conversation with employees
at different levels. Fe is one not to mix his social life with his
professional; he believes tese are separate aspects of one's life,
and that this orientation frees him to have a clear, professional
commitment to lead. He firmly believes that all business people are
not "bad" or "exploiting" others, and believes that people are coming
around. to realizing this again after the anti-business sentiment that
pervaded the U.~. a few years ago.
He recognizes that people have a definite need to attribute "all"
the credit to the leader of an organization. He said he has found this
to be true in some instances where press credits him with some actions
directly the result of one of te executives. He said it was important
to him to give credit to where it was due; thus, he brought up this
situation to others. The matter was left at this when it as realized
Fisher, as the leader of Prime, would also receive the negative
'accusations" as well as the priase if the occasion for such arrived.
Overall, Fisher is a calm, confident leader who speaks clearly
about Prime, its employees, its place in the market, and its mission (to
make money for the stockholders.) Vhile he recognizes that others may
lead Prime in a different ay, he is confident that his style works
for him and Prime. He is realistic in saying that many others could
have his job, so, in one sense, he was "lucky". On the other hand,
he does not mean to minimize what his unicue contribution has been and
continues to be.
When asked why he iwanted to become CEO, Fisher said it had "little
to do with money, and a lot to do with leading."
Strata ry
In the three years before Fisher, Prime had accumulated losses
of about $2 million. Since Fisher, Prime gleaned S72.4 million net
profit in five years. A Forbes article described his contribution:
"Fisher quickly identified the business and professional markets as the
one to aim at. Prime's products are beautifully packaged for that
market, encouraging a quality image. Today they sell at higher prices...
Prime also works from hand to mouth, carrying virtually no order book
but promising to deliver within 60 days. DEC, by comparison, has a
9 to 12 month backlog of orders."6 Obviously, things changed when
Fisher came. But why? rthat was it about Fisher's leadership that
created the environment that the changes took place? It is the hope
of this author that by looking first at leadership theory and
research, and then, at an analysis of these theories applied to the
Prime case, more understanding pxill be gained about successful leadership
in action.
III Review of the Literature
lEADFSHIP THEORY
An overview of various aspects of leadership theory will provide
the necessary framework for analysis. cGregor, in the early 60's, iden-
tified four major variables involved in leadership, and these are useful
to recall as a starting point. They are: (1) the caraceristics of
the leader; (2) the attitudes, needs, and other personal characteristics
of the followers; (3) the characteristics of the organization, such as
its purpose, its structure, the nature of the task to be performed;
and (4) the social, economic and political milieu. The ersonal
characteristics required for effective performance as a leader vary,
depending on the other factors.
McGregor stresses that this is important in that it means that
leadership is not a property of the individual, but a
7
complex relationship among the variables.
More recently, Arrrs states that when faced with the task of
providing a conclusion bout leadership, researchers suggest that
leadership behavior depends primarily upon the situation and not
upon any inherent leadership abilities, although some traits may be
8
cornon to all leaders. Carter, leadership researcher, typifies
the middle-ocf-the-road conclusion wThen he states, "As a Renra
statement, it would appear that leadership is neither completely
general nor completely specific."
One of the initial ways researchers have analysed a particular
leader has been to observe .,+?ether that leader was participative or
directive. bass (1976) reviews how a leader's tendency to be
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directive or participative depends on certain personal and situational
attributes and factors. He argues that one leader can be participative
and effective in the same situation, where another would need to be
directive to be effective.
He points out that the proponents of participative management assume
that, in most ork situations 1) everyone wants to share
in the decision-processes of consequence; 2) everyone can contribute
usefully to the decision process; 3) generally, there is under-utilization
of the available talent. Bass suggests that in order to be able to
both prescribe and predict which approach a leader will take, one
must first know about 1) the leader in the iven situation; 2)
his subordinates; 3) the external envirenment; ) the internal climate
of the organization; and 5) the work that is done.1 0
Bass identified seven clusters of attributes of the leader in a
situation as making a difference as to whether he or she will he
participative or directive. These attributes are interpersonal,
personal, cultural, and educational. Others relate to the leader's
status, what he is personally seeking for himself, and what e is
seeking to accomplish.
The following are tables that show Bass' interpretation of the
research of Fiedler, cCGregor, Argyris, Leavitt, Patchem, and others;
and the appropriate classification of this data to suppoet the
tendency that a leader will be either directive or participative
,a
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Table 1
Attributes of a Leader If e is as Below, ten a Leader tends
1. Interpersonal Attributes:
Valued and liked,
icentified with,
acknowledged as expert,
rewarding figure
2. Personal Attributes:
a. Social ideology:
Authoritarian or egalit-
arian: Theory X or Theory
y
b. Attitudes tcvard om
capabilities°
c. Attitudes toward
subordinate capabilities
1) Capabilities
2) Ideas
Directive:
Very much or
very little esteem
Autho rita rian,
Theory X
High self-esteem,
self-c6nfidencd
Do not value
rUninte reste d
Participative:
Moderate esteem
Ega 1 itaria n,
Theory Y
Low self-esteem,
self-confidence
Value highly
Interested
doSpecific beliefs
about effects of anage-
ment style
1) Participation
promotes morale
2) Participation
promotes pro-
ductivity
3) Supervisors are
retarded for
dirpct iv~ness
4) Legitimacy of
directiveness
3. Culture
No Yes
No Yes
Yes No
Legit ima te
North uropean,
Creek, Indian
Pattern A
T1 legitimate
U."., J.K., Latin
to be
. .
.
Pattern Bi4. Training
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5o Status Attributes:
ao Importance of position,
legitimacy of position,
position of control and
power
b. Centrality to
infor. ation
co Span of control
6. Personal Objectives:
a, Time perspective
b. Esteem sought
c. Desired source of
esteem
7. Job Objectives
Very much or very
little status
Central
La rge
Short-tenn
To be valued
Superiors
Output quantity
(Avoidance of risk
and uncertainty)
Crderliness
'oderate st-atus
Periphe ra 1
Small
Long-term
To be liked
Subordina tes
Creativity
Yo ra le
Fla-ibi litv
Understa nding of
subordina tes
Development of
subo rdina tes
Table 2
_, i· 
- - - -
Attributes of is
Subordinates
If Subordinates are as below, then a leader
tends to be
Directive: Participative:
1. Intragroup elations:
shared norms, purposes,
interests; cohesion, absence
of conflict, homogeneity of
attitudes
Very high, very
low cohesion
Moderate cohesion
20. Personal and Interpersoral
Attributes:
ao Level of skill and
knowledge; esteem
bo Authoritarian vs.
egalitarian
Authoritarian Ega litcrian
Low High
-31-
Table 3
Attributes of Outside
F.nv i ro rne nt
1. Stable or Changing
Marketplace
If the Outside Environment is ase-T6w,
then a leader tends to be:
Directive Participative
'Stable Turbulent
2. Current Economic
Situation
3. Culture; Client
Attitudes, Expectations
Recession
Tra ditiorial
Prosperity
Post-industrial
Table 4
Attributes of the
Organizational Climate
If the Organizational Climate is as Below,
then a leader tends to be:
Directive Participative
1. Current Economic Health
2. Structure in Which
%tork Group is Embedded
a. Departmental function
Unpro f itab le('Profit squeeze')
Tight money; losing
money; intolerable
costs, contracting
business
Product ion,
Accounting,
Finance
Pro fitable
surplus money;
Highly pro fitable
enterprise;
Tolerable costs,
expanding business
Research, Personnel,
General Mana gement
bo Line or staff
c. Production system Hass ,hatch
do Centralisation Directive Directive or Participative
e. Negotiating
requirements
Flexibility
fo Inmediate "boss" of
leader
go Number of hierarchical
levels trained in
participation
Directive
Few
Participative
Many
Line Sta ff
Process
Support
_ I ______
h. acceptance of
participation as legit- No
irmate for subordinate
i. Differential
motivations
Requires
nurturing
Responsive to
reward and punish-
ment0oPre fe rs
oreder, principle,
materialistics;
ba rga ine ro
Needs to belong
Needs information
Needs understanding
Jo Independence
needs
3. Culture, Tradition
4. Training
5. Job Attributes:
ao Importance of
positicn
bo Centrality to
information
Greek
Pattern A
Low status
Peri heral
Dutch -Flemish
*
Pattern 1
High status
Centra 1
6. Personal Objectives:
a. Time perspective
bo Esteem sought To be liked To be valued
c. Desired scurce of
esteem
7. Task Objectives Low risk and
uncertainty,
Lo .? invo lvement,
tUninte rested
Creativity
Personal rowth
Satisfaction
Invn lremen t ,
Interested
-32-
Yes
Veak Strong
Short -run Long-run
Superior Peers
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Table 5
Task Requirements If the Task Recuirements are s Below,
a leader tends to be:
Directive Participative
1. Characteristics of
Poblem and Decision
Requirements
ao Solution to problem Unitary,
Convergent
Multiple, Divergent
b. High quality required
co Emergency action;
rapid decisions
d. Amount of structure,
division of labor;
coordination required
e. PRutine or variec
f. Machine-paced
Very high,
Very low
Routine
Yes
gPractical or theoretical Practical
Very igh;
Ve , low
Theoretical
N'odera te
h. Intellectual, problem-
solving, or manual,
manipulative
Yanua 1 Intellectual
2.Qonsequences of Task
Completipn
aConflic s of interest for Yes
subordinates (i.e., salary
increases 
No
b o Outcome of consequence to:Organization Subora!ina tes
3. Motives and Constraints
a. Stressful, pressure,
strain
b. Can be delegated;
subordinates have control
or skills
c. Interaction potential,
group size
Very i Th;
very low
No
Low
No Yes
Yes No
Moderate
Varied
No
'oderP te
Yes
High
_ .- , I
-34-
d. Cost of participation Expensive Cheap
Pattern A- no leadership training
Pattern B- leadership-sensitivity training
While such a simple categorization of research done on leadershin
tends to necessitate unrealistic polarization of the different
attributes, (i.e., high self-esteem, low self-esteem, uninterested,
interested) it provides a matrix of variables that can be analyzed.
This model is actually descriptive, although its intent is to move
towards being prescriptive. It is built on a hypothesis that states that
the effective leader is more likely to approach the norm for the
handling and coping with a specific situational demand. One that is
established, one can prescribe. In other words, if this is so, one
should behave in this way.
Gils t1974) agrees with the development ot a "situational"
approach to leadership, in which the structure of the ormanization, the
-35-Task environment, including the technology of' the organization, the
external environment, and work group behavior all influence the leader's
behavior. e states: "leadership behavior is to be understood by
having knowledge of the placd of the leader in the organizational
system. In this conception, leadership behavior is a behavioral
strategy." 1 1
Gils seems to be implying that leadership an be analyzed as a
form of strategic behavior in a complex relational network. It swould
seem important to conceptualize and analyze this network, and
especially, the way in which the task environment influences the
goals which are set, and the constraints that might lie in te way
of achieving these goals.
Lawrence and Lorsch do seek to categorize different types of
organizational nedds, different staoes of a company's growth, different
kinds of enviornments, and such, and then, to identify organization
structures that might be appropriate to each of these different
situations (1971).12 They refer to a "contingency model" of
organizations where structure depends upon the nature of te tasks
with which they are meant to deal. Their studies indicate that within
one organization, different structures can exist, and that leadership
behavior required (i.e., participative or irective) is to a large
extent influenced by the characteristics of the technology. In a
study of a particular industry here the technology as stable and
predictable, a traditional pyramidal orpanization structure has advantpoes,
but where technology is unpredictable and the nroducts diverse, a
decentralized non-hierarchical organization structure is best.
Jacobs (1974)13 speaks of this difficult tc to "-36tlo-ue -" al
the variables that contribute to leadership behavior. He noted the
past attempts made to identify underlving dimensions by which leader-
ship could be characterized either in simplistic or universalistic
terms that would generalize meaningfully to a wider variety of
situations.
Motivated by this, Jacobs attempted to explore the potential of
social exchange theory as just such an underlying explanatory frame-
work for dealing %with leadership phenomena. He points out that a
basic premise of social exchange theory is that social behavior is
regulated by the relative costs and benefits of such behavior to
participants, under the assumption that each individual seeks to
maximize his benefits and reduce his costs. For example, a compliment
usually "'costs" little; but asking for advice is n implied compliment,
perhaps, which is costly to the requester. The implied compnliment is
that the other is more competent. The cost is a loss of self-esteem
or stature relative to the other.
As also demonstrated by ollander and Julian,l Jacobs notes that
the leadership role requires an unusual level of competence that most
group members do not have. Because individuals with this level of
competence (usually in an area that contributes to the attainment of
group goals) are relatively rare, they are almost always highly
valued by their groups. Because they can provide unique contributions
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to the attainment of group goals# it becomes worthwhile for their roups
to provide them vwth unique rewards in return. These rewards usually
take the form of status, esteem, and influence potential. The
relationship between the leader and his group therefore is an
equilibrium, as sonm in Fig. 1, in which benefits of rou.ghly
equal value are exchanged between the leader and the led. It is
probable that there is a strong tendency for this exchange to reach
a point of stable equilibrium, in w-ich the esteem sati sfactions the
leader may extract from is position in the group are just balanced
by the value of the contributions he can make to the roup, ,where tat
value is determined by the group through either explicit or implicit
consensus.
111
Status, Fsteem
Influence Potential
Leader Group
Uniquely valuable Contributions j
to Group oal Attainment /
Hollander15 suggests that the process of eergence to a position
of leadership probably consists first of gaining visibility nd then
of consolidating gains. The key processes apparently consist both of
conformity to te roup's norms, at least initially, and of mal-ing
uniquely valuable contributions to the attainment of group goals.
Exchange theory suggests still a third requirement, that of estimating
the worth of one's contributions, and then of beginning successfully
with the group to obtain apporxiately thf level of status nd< esteem
satisfactions they eyrect ill he demanded in return for tse
contributions. Jacobs sugests there is a ood chance that an
individual will exclude himself from a position of leadership if e
l- I f i
fails on any of these counts.
Jacobs also uses social excba.nge teory t.o establish a. fr;meT.,orr
of observing the basis of a leader's nfluence in . fornpl orvni7tion.
The three modes of influence he identifies are po,-er, utForitv, nd
leadership; an a matrix tat escribes the effects of tese influence
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If these definitions are taken at face value, it seems likely that little
leadership occurs in most formal organizations. Jacobs points out that
leadership is not very cost-effective. Persuasive interaction which is
effective in changing the beliefs and attitudes of organizational members
and the norms of work groups is difficult and time consuming. Thus, there
is probably an over-reliance on position power in many organizations,
the costs of this over-reliance on position power may be inflexibilitv,
brought about by resistance to change, or fixation of organizational
performance at some minimum level, rather than at a much higher level
sometimes needed.16
Leader-follower relationships were studied from another angle by
Crcwe, bochner and Clark (1972) who found that both autocratically
and democratically oriented management leaders ehaved democratically
with democratic subordinates, and autocratically with autocratic
subordinates .17
It is important to recognize that the situational approach conceives
of leadership in terms of function performed, rather than in terms of
persisting traits of the leader. Hollander (1964) also distinguishes
between the different sources of authority as a leader, that of "emerged"
contrasted with "'imposed" leadership. The acceptance of influence, which
is conditional upon the consent of followers, produces "emergent"
leadership. "'Imposed" leadership tends to be determined by superior
authority, although it is possible to have these reside in the same
person, as in many institutions whose imposed leaders have chrracter-
istics which would make them acceptable as emergent leaders as well.
Hemphill 19 (1961) alludes to tis distinction from a sliehtlv
different perspective. He sees leadership not simply as a part of a
structure, but rather as an instrumental agent determining the shape
it should take. "Attempted" leadership is based on such initiations
of new structure; however, the leadership act is incomplete unless that
initiation is accepted. he reported one study in which the degree of
-LAitiation by a leader is significantly raised or lowered by the ccertance
that person is led to believe he has, through a form of social rein-
forcerrent. Hollander supports this in pointing out tat the aintcilre'*
of leadership, even by an imrosed leader, requires a re£ard for the
working relationships which are affected by assertions of ower.2 0
Hollander clearly s-mmarizes this concert of social influence in
the maintenance of leadership in the following:
'The leader's emergence or waning of status is thus
inextricably linked to the prevailing situation, both
as group merbers understand it from the information at
hand and as they hold attachments to ersons or
orientations, present but also ast. A change of the
influence structure must necessarily overcome the
resistance which these factors erect and ecouraee. It
is not so uch, then, the "man or the times" as it
appears to be the percepticn of the man and what he
represents himself to be and to stand for in the context
of the already enve!cDina situation. Yet, once having
achieved status of ,h.i2h influence, what he does may not
and indeed need not fit past expectations for, in the
maintenance of his osition, he is obliged to fulfill
new expectations which arise as the situation
inevitably is altered.2 1
-.42-
Attaining leadership, then, can be thought of as determining a
differentiation of status allowing for potential influence; maintaining
leadership refers to factors which interrelate to yield acceptance
of that influence, the effectiveness of leadership referring to the
latter process. Hollander makes the distinction between emergent. and
imposed leadership more so to describe the social influence process that
a leader is involved (an imposed leader may also "emerge" as the leader,
although this is not necessarily true) than to stress that the operation
of the group is any different in each case. He said, instead of. traits;oet.,
and regardless of source of influence, several behavioral processes
seem to be important in determining the effectiveness of leadership.
First, providing the group with structure and goal-setting; second,
maintaining a flexibility and adapability in handling charging
requirements as new situations develop; and, third, establishing
social relationships which arise from a predictability of behavior
on the leader's part which manifests itself in emotional stability,
dependability, and fairness in istributing rewards.
Bavelad (1960)22 suggests a behavioral definition of leadership.
He says that in the aggregate, leaders are those who perform certain
categories of task rather than share characteristic attributes of
personality. The question to be asked, he says, is not "Who is the
leader?" but "'hat functions are to be fulfilled?" He implies that the
common functional requirements in institutional situations reveals the
expectation of an interchangeability of leadership personel.
The American anagement Association defines some of the behavioral
-.43-
elements of the role of a Chief Executive Officer. " The operating officer
has to plan, lead, and monitor. To plan, he has to decide what to do; to
lead he has to get things done through others; to monitor, he has to
sense and evaluate all that relates to planning and leading-both inside
and outside the frm. 2 3
It also points out that as a general practice, CEO's delegate "re-
curring tasks"; follow a policy of noninterference in functional reas, and
counsel subordinates, but do not rra-e their decisions. Uniiue tasks
performed by the Chief Executive also include, most importantly,
.Setting forth the philosophy of the company
.Establishing corporate objectives
.Initiating and guiding strategic and long-range planning
James Quinn speaks comprehensively on the subject of chief
executive comunication of strategy and goals.
'Top managers generally like to keep their
options open as long as possible consistent
with the information they have. Cne way to
accomplish this is to define only broad
directions and then res-ond to specific,
well-docurmented proosals...The few eoals
top ranagers do anrounce tend (1) to reflect
or help build consensus, (2) to be broad enough in
concept to allow flexibility and oportunism,
and (3) to be sufficiently distant in time that 25
several possible options could ensure teir achieverent.'
He points out that in setting organizational oals, while they must
be general enough to achieve widespread support, they must clearlv
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delineate what distinguishes the "us" from "them".
In emphasizing only broad directions, and then responding to
specific, well-documented proposals, this approach makes it more
likely that proposers will identify with their propositions and see
them through. This is, in fact, uinn points out, an example of a
contribution to "incrementalism" in goal setting and strategy formalation.
This kind of approach, he feels, allows an organization to approach new
fields flexibly as opportunities develop. Quinn finds a reasonable amount
of data to support a broad goal-setting strategy for the CEO. Ouinn states
that companies have found that broad goals can create identity and "elan".
A basic premise is that effective organizational goals satisfy a basic
human need. They enable people to develop a larger identity-
to participate in greater challenges, and to have influence or seek
rewards they could not achieve alone. It has often been found that many
employees can identify better with broad oals like being the best
or the first in an area than they can with more specific numerical oals.
Quinn points out the value of effective goal setting as borne out
in company across industries. "ost companies devote great attention to
measurable output goals--productivity, profit, costs or returns--that
lack charisma and provide no special identity to their people . Yet,
they often fail to achieve these goals precisely because their people
do not identify sufficiently with the company. To forge a common bond
among individuals with widely diverse personal values, expectations and
capacities, such numerical goals must be teamed with goals that
satisfy people's more basic psychological needs: to obtain recognition,
to be free, to achieve security..." Tn addition to the
charismatic leader's establishine a transcendant goal for the
-45-
company's strategy, he points out that planning processes must refine goals
into specific targets for operation or tactical units. But even here, he
states, successful goal-setting is best achieved through incremental,
iterative processes that intimately involve those who have to implement
the proposed staregic thrusts. He believes that strategy building is a
.kind of "logical incrementalism" that requires the kind--though not the
degree--of participation and committment building that are the touchstones
of Japanese theories, McGregor's theory and a "Bottom Up" philosophy.
In particular, goals should be specific to precipitate action.
After building consensus around a broad goal, the top execttive rav merely
approve its specific manifestation, Ouinn observes. By making selected
goals explicit at the proper monent, managers can create a challenge,
precipitate desired discussions or analvses,.or crystallize defined
thrusts.
Some of the day-to-day implementations of setting strategy and
goals are making decisions and delegating. Decision making is an
important element of the leader's functioning. eckhad2 9 describes
an effective organization as one in vhich decisions are made by and near
*the sources of information regardless of where these sources are located
on the organization chart.
MANACMFNT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CFRNAE
In setting the stage for his theory of emergent leadership,
Hollander speaks about how a group with a well-entrenched social form
or pattern of behavior comes to recognize that a change must take lace.
He states that for change to be instigated, there must be a comparison
between things as they are and things as they might be. This, he says,
suggests a flow of information through some channel of communication.
Katz and Lazarsfeld 30 (1955) and ervel and Katz31 (1955) in their
works found that the leader is found to be a person who provides an
interpretation of the world outside the immediate group. It is he who
conveys a structure in terms of "social reality", and the acceptance of
innovation. Hollander claims that change can no longer be attributed
to "the man or the times". It is more a matter of studying the
combined impact of the leader and the social context upon the view,
that the followers will hold of their world. This is seen by Hollander
to be significant to their associated willingness to undertake carge.
In short, he claims that neither man nor the situation exists
independently of the other since, in the emergence asnect of leadership,
group members operate from the base of a situation and the articular
demands it makes for "task requirements."
ieckhard32 describes organization change in detail, saying
that it must be managed from the top. The change must be related to
organizational mission and goals. It must be "owned" by the key people
in the organization, usually at several levels. It also must be system-
oriented; relating to the total organization or significant parts.
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He contends that real organization change will not take place and
stay maintained unless three conditions are obtained-
1)There must be real dissatisfaction with the status uo-
a high enough level of dissatisfaction to mobilize energy toward
some change.
2)There must be in the organization leader's head some icture of
a desired state which woul be worth mbilizing energy to change toward.
3)There must be in the organization leader's head a knowledee and
picture of some practical first step toward this desired state of energv
is to be mobilized to start.
If any one of these three conditions does not exist in strength,
the "cost" (economic and emotional) of changing is likely to be too high.
In addition to looking at organizational change, and management of
that change, it is useful, for purposes of this case, to look at
research done on a change in leadership.
Teulings and Otter (1974)33 look at the issue of leadership succession
and recruitment. They develop seven hypotheses that employ the use of a
'typology' of successors that includes four tyres discussed in the
literature: the outsider, the strong man, the professional, and the
youngster. At the level of organizational characteristics, three
classes of variables are considered to be relevant: the degree of
bureaucracy, the level of organizational performnance, and the level of
interpersonal tension. They evelop a model in which organizational
variables enter twice; first as determinants of recruitment, and second
as functions of the succession process, pointing to the direction of
subsequent organizational change, as visualized in the figure below.
I II
Organizationa 1 Cbaracter'-
istics before recruitment
Tve of
Successor
III 
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Direction of subsecuent crPan-
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A, Degree of ureaucracvl g
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decisionrma.king
2, functional-snecial-
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social relations /64. proliferation of / r
rules and rulaticr r ve o 
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Direction of te bureau-
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4. external sunsort
5. external cc-ceraticn
Arrows refer to the direction of influences, the nbers refer to the
numbered hypotheses.
The hpctheses they develop are the follo-ing:
Hypothesis 1: T.e higher the degree of bureaucracy, the lower the
chances of recruitment for outsiders, younsters, pro-
fessicnals and strcr men as successors.
H>vtothesis 2: The lover the level of crganization 1 performance, te
hieher thp chances of recruitment for outsiders nd strong
men as successors.
- -
__
i
I
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Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of bureaucracy, the fewer tensions -till
occur as a result of the succession rocess.
hypothesis 4: The higher the level of organisational performance the hither
the chances of interpersonal tensions coupled with the success.
ton process.
Hypothesis 5: Outsiders and strong men are more likely to evoke inter-
personal tensions than other types of successors.
*
hypothesis 6: Outsiders and strong men are more likely to encourage
tendencies towards re-) bureaucratism;
professionals and youngsters are more likely to evoke
changes towards debureaucratism.
Hypothesis 7: Outsiders and strong en are more likely than other
types of successors to succeed in restoring oraanisational
performance.
supported by results.
The method employed by the researchers as a retrosnective
questionnaire (inspired by alkrt) 3 4, where a uestion was asked to
describe the present situation (leader In place for at least 1 year)
and the situation x years earlier. The results are meaningful it the
successor variables are explained. "Outsider" was measured on a scale
range from outsider uorked outside organization) to insider (arked inside
organization); "Professional" PhF versus without; "Strong lan" was
Carter's3 5 'individual prominence" where an individual has achieved
-50-
outstanding recognition in a given social environment; youngster indicated
the 'generation' represented.
The results oat the study support hypotheses (2), (4), nd (6). The
first hypothesis, stating that bureaucratic organization are less willirn
to recruit 'deviant' types of successors was only confirmed in the
resistance to hire the "strong man". The results did suggest that a
high degree of "vertical" structuring (indicated by three elements of
bureaucratic structure, i.e., centralization, hierarchization, and
impersonal relationsips) favored the recruitment of weak or under-
qualified successors. A high degree of 'horizontal' structuring
(indicated by specialization and proliferation of rules and procedures)
leads to an increased chance of so-called bureaucratic succession:
internal promotion according to rules of seniority.
A low level of organizational performance appears to be & positive
incentive towards the recruitment ot outsiders and strong men.Results also
suggest that organizations that have developed strong integrative sstens
(indicated by a proliferation of rules and regulations and hierarchization)
are more vulnerable to the possible disruptive consequences of manaeerial
succession, the managerial role requiring more co-ordinative action be
taken. Also, if the organization is strongly integrated with its immediate
context (indicated by high support from and co-operation with other pDrts of
the organization) the chances o interpersonal tensions again increase.
In general, the results favor the view that organizational conditions
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prior to the succession have a greater impact upon the course of events
than the selective recruitment itself. There is no correlation-
between the type of successor recruited and the chances of subenuent
interpersonal tension.
Finally, results indicate that in particular, the outsider and strong
man are effective change agents, but that their role is limited. They
introduce changes only where the previou: situation was sch as.to make a
change very likely, if the level of bureaucracy is comparatively low, a
process of re-bureaucratization will follow, if the previous level of
performance is substandard, their effect again is restricted to restoring
performance to an acceptable level.
The phen-oenon known as anticipatory reorganization 36 of advance
adjustment to a potential successor, is supported here as an assumed
connection between the type of succession and the subsequent direction of
the reshaping of the organization. t'he data supports the "th" that
outsiders and strong men fulfill their role expectations as ultimate
saviors in times of trouble. On the other hand, the data suggests that,
if confronted with a troubling situation, other types of successors
have just as much chance as succeeding. 'rhe study concludes that the
succession itself is probably of more consequence than who succeeds.
One researcher, Peter Ryan, studied the leader in a market.
oriented company. This is the orientation that Fisher led'Prime
towards, so an examination of his conclusions is useful. Ryan
summarizes his observations of several companies in the following.
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"It is up to the chief executive to make sure tat
every department in the company is eared--individually
and collectively--to give the customer what he wants.
This, in essence, is integrated marketine--the single
most important development in marketing today. And
it's up to the chief executive to make sure his
company's marketing is built around this concert,
..*The pretident must keep in mind that he has ultimate
responsibility for marketing. ne must establish the
procedures and the organization, and he must ask the
questions that keep his executives on the right track.
In short, he is the marketing leader of his company.
But note the word "leader". e must not fall into the
trap of becoming nis own director of marketing, any more
than he should assume the daily responsibilities of other
functions. Because he's the dominant figure in long
range planning, he's the right man to make sure that
marketing is the basis for all planning eing done in
other corporate areas.
... One of the most important roles in marketing for the
chief executive is that of chief uestion asker. This is
because he is best euinved to ask the right cuestions
and to sense whether he is etting the riht answers. H.e
or she must look at his company and ask:
'Is research and development roducing ideas that lead
to products the customer wants, or la the real objective
losing out to some fascinating scientific problem?"36
Another factor that can be considered in the transition process, in
addition to the management of that transition; the influence of the
succession process and the definition of a new orientation, is the fit
or .cgruence of the new leader (CEO) with the existing leaders in
the organization, or, the development of a whole new team of leaders.
Peter Sterm notes that in recent years, some attention has been
directed to the question of whether or not knowledge retarding the
style of one leader contributes to our ability to predict. the
leader~374)38 ~-53-effectiveness of another leader.37 Kerr (1974)38 speaks of the term
"leadership style congruence." t.e concludes, on the basis of a brief
review of several studies in this area, that leadership style congruence
is likely to be important, but its usefulness is probably more important
in some situations rather than others.
Evans (1973)3 9 and nealey and Fiedler (1q68)4 0 provide some suggestions
as to a potential theoretical base for leadership congruence research.Evans
identifies two.major types of leadership contingency models: consistency
models (where the highest level of performance and satisfaction occur when
environmental, organizational, task and leadership variables are consistent
with each other), and compensatory models (where the highest levels of
performance and satisfaction occur when environmental, organizational, task,
and leadership variables complement each other, or where a lack of one
is made up by strengths in another).
A second theoretical issue concerns the exact meaning of leadership
style congruence. Does the concept of congruence mean a similarity
of leadership styles profile between two leaders, or does it mean
dissimilarity of .leadership styles, an interactive profile indicates
better representation? Lawrence and Lorsch (1969)41 seem to postulate
that similar leadership styles lead to the highest level of effectiveness
for more complex organizational designs.
Kerr&2 , on the other hand, implies that in a less complex, hierarchical
design, a compensatory or complementary profile may be the most apropriate.
This framework acknowledges that: (1) different leadership styles are
-54-
required at different levels in the organizational hierarchy
because of the variety of job demands encompassed within these levels;
and (2) the deficiencies of the behavior of one leader rmay be stis+
fied, or compensated, by the behavior of a leader at another level.
A final theoretical issue that is related concerns whether the
focus of study is leadershi style congruence or leadership congruence.
The leader's style can be thought of as relating to the process com-
ponent of leadership; that is: the directive, surportive, particip-
ative behaviors of the leader which have been extensively investigated
through the use of the hio State scales. 3 The other maor leader-
ship component may be called the reward comnoonent, which relates to t
the outccmes of subordirmate behavior which. re recoenized and
rewarded (or punished) by the leader.i4 Past studies have son
that the reward behavior of the leader enerallv results in stronger
relationships with subordinate satisfaction and erformance than
the relatiodiships found with "style" dimensions. This m.ieht seem to
argue that leader rewards niay overshadow effects on subordinate
behavior caused by the particular structure of the organization.
looking at these components of leadership-style or process,
and reward, a suggested approach would be to consider consistency and
compensatory models as being applicable to te particular organ-
isational structrre. Tor example, consstmry models--
IL5 _, ~ 6 1969! apear to beGalbraith, 1972; Lawrence and lcrsc`, 1969) apnear to be
most applicable to the more ccmplex, lateral structural arranieeeret.
Compersatory models, on the other hand, may he more applicable to
hieracchical, or bureaucratically based structures.
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Extending work done by ealey and Fiedler (1968), which discusses
differences and similarities in managerial role requirements at different
organizational levels, we might conclude that hierarchical leadership style
congruence might be negatively related to such criteria as performance
and/or satisfaction. Some support for this is provided also by ill and
Hunt (1973).4&hey found that need-dissatisfaction was lower when the
leadership styles of the first two mangerial levels are different rather
than the same. On the other hand, a study by Osborn and-Hunt (1974)4 9
would seem to suggest the opposite; that is, that hierarchical congruence
rather than incongruence is desirable.
Osborn50 claims that variety in leadership styles is a requirement for
high effectiveness in a complex situation. This corresponds to Lawrence
and orsch's concept of differentiation. The key prerequisite
for effectiveness in their framework, however, is integration, which
focuses on either a separate integrator role of some similarity between
the behaviors of interacting leaders.
Theory -and research done in the areas of definition of the
concept of leadership, on the formulation of strategy and goal-setting,
and on the implication of interaction and fit among leaders in an
organization, are 411 limited, to some extent, to the specific nature of
the individual situation or situations being studied. However, the
studies and theories that have been selected appear to explain more
than isolated situations. because of either the breadth or depth of
their study, the theory and research presented here can effectively be
applied to a particular situation in organizational leadership for the
purpose of developing a deeper understanding of that leadership.
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V Analysis of Prime Leadershi
TI LEADER
Ken Fisher is an articulate composed leader who feels strongly about
being a leader. His officers, some of whom were at one time associates
of Fisher's at Honeyvell, and to of whom were original founders of Prime,
regard him highly, and credit him with the success of Prime's Saeressive
turn-around in 1975. Prime was a stniggling 100-employee corporation,
unprofitable until 1975. The environment was such that Prime was paainst
corporate computer "giants" (IBM, DC) ineffectively and inappropriately
seo.
These above might be considered the basic variables that comprise the
complex leadership relationship at Prine, using Mc(rezor's theory 6f
leadership that recognizes its foundation in a framework. We also
recall Argryris' more recent argument, that leadership behavior
depends primarily upon the situation and not upon any inherent leadership
abilities that are common to all. both Fisher and his executives felt
that some other CEO might have steered the company in the same marketing
direction (provided they had a marketing orientation, perhaps) but "no one
else would have accomplished this in the exact same way." One wants to
ask the question, what then, was the major force in Prime's successful
transition? Looking at the variables, one could hyrothesize: the leader,
the product inherent capability, the readiness of the oreanization for cbne,
the opportunities of the marketplace, Just the evolution that would
have occurred regardless, iven a minimum amount of the above criteria.
Fisher's executives elt that Fisher was responsible or the
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successful growth of Prime..."'before he came it was one way...after he
came it was another." Thev noted that he initiated the ccoordinated
marketing orientation; Fisher contends that the financing was lprrely
the effort of the chief financial officer. To surmarize the ualities
that may have enabled Fisher to rake a successful impact were his _
bility to manage people;his ability to cormunicate his ideas, his
ability to develop a cc-pany strategy. The environmental variables
that may have contributed were the inherent capabilities of Prime's
products and the (then) as-f-yet untapped markets; and the strong
financial controls within the organization. One ay to look at the
factors involved may be to weigh them according to importance in
bringing about the successful turn of events. The ercenticns
of the executives would seem to indicate that Fisher's being the
leader was most impocrtant,(incorporating his strengths in marketin
and his cmmitment to firrncial control) followed by the functloa.litv
of the product and the untapped markets. Their perception mi!fht
imply that there is an underlying assumption that the leader is a
more important variable in a situation than any given "opportunitVy
or situation. An obvious empirical test would be to duplicate te
exact scenario, and vary one of the variables, i.e., the leader,
the products, etc..., however, this is the impossible tast-, and
one of the major difficulties of "proving" the relative
importance of a leader or of envirormental factors. Perhaps
the closest approximation of this kind of empirical test wculd be to
compare te situation at Prime with the ex-CEO to the situationwith
Fisher. The major difference is the leader; althouah the situation
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could perhaps be thought of as different because of a different
time in the history of the company. however, it also seems obvious wben.l
looking at one leader compared to another, several factors must be taken
into consideration. For instance, a leader's level of investment nd
commitment may be important in influencing his or her success; strengths
relative to the requirements of the job; past experience as a leader,
etc... There has been research done on various of these factors. For
instance, one study observed leaders who had xperi c l in l'eadership
positions with those who had none; it also compared leaders who had had
leadership sensitivity training sessions with those who had not. The
result of the study was thatilee past experience did not necessarily
improve the performance of the leader, that sensitivity training did.
However, there are many other single characteristics of the leader that
have not been singularly studied in terms of their relative importance
in determining effective leadershipt or has any study looked at the
relative importance of one characteristic of a leader versus another
particular characteristics in influencing their effectiveness. It is
important to note that this point does not disregard the situational
approach to the wtudy of leadership; rather, it simply isolates
the characteristics of the leader for discussion purposes.
This point may sound as if it is the familiar leadership research
hypothesis of a good "fit" being important for effective leadership.
The "'good fit" assumption implies that the relative importance of certain
characteristics is dependent upon the particular situation requirements.
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However, for a given situation, the relative importance has not been
measured. For instance, in the situation under study, it is not clear
what the most important characteristic of Ken Fisher (again, here we
are not ignoring the situational factors, simply addressing one factor
at a time-the leader.) as it his past marketing experience, particularly
as a leader! Or was it his ability to "fit" in at Prime in terms of the
people already there? Ur was it his "conceptual style" of leadership?
Implicit in this questioning is an assumption that it is useful to know
which of any particular qualities is most important in predicting leader-
ship effectiveness in a iven situation. Hovwever, this may not be the
most important avenue to pursue. Rather than a certain situation reouiring
a particular strength or strengths of a leader, that iven solution
may require, instead, a minimum amount of a unique set of characteristics.,
To pursue the first path, however, that of addressing the individual
cnaracteristic's relative importance, wemight, in the case of Fisher,
hypothesize that his ability to lead by direction, to have a strong
conceptual vision of a future successful scenario for Prime, a atttibute
that would enable him to lead effectively in several or perhaps any
other situation. n the other hand, perhaps Fisher's marketing
orientation was a skill or attribute that enabled him to be successful
at Prime, but would be less applicable to any given situation, relative
to the previous attribute mentioned. Thus, some attributes of a leader
may be more important for any situation, other attributes may be more
important for a iven situation. Furthermore, in that eiven situation,
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the universally applicable attribute (perhaps the ability to concertualize
leadership) may still be more imrortant than the Particular attribute
(i.e., marketing orientation), In other words, even though a situation rapv
require a leader with a strong marketing drive, while another situation
might not, another characteristic, "conceptual leadership", for instance,
might still be more important in the situation, although it is not
limited to being important in this situation only.
We can illustrate this point very simply in the case of Prime
by hypothetically considering the requirements that the Doard of
Directors may have identified as necessary for the leadership at Prime.
It is known that the board of Directors was looking for someone with
marketing exterience that would be anlicable at Prime, and it could
be assumed they were looking for someone with "leadership" ability,
although we might not venture to say that a particular leadership
style or attributes were sought. In any case, a way to deict the
fact that a subtle distinction may exist between what is valued or eou1ht
after by a company in its leader and what may actually e tore mortant,
in the following:
Prime seeks a.... Fisher has to ofer...
.Leader .Leader
,Proven Marketeer .Proven Marketeer
It ranks these...
? Proven Marketing Fecord
? Leader
Yore important to success at Prime More irrportant in anv situation...
1. Proven marketeer 1. Leader
2. Leader 2. Proven marketeer
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Thus, this example implies the potential for this kind of scenario:
a company looks for a leader (iven) with the primary requirement of being
marketing oriented. A leader is selected; it turns out that a particular
characteristic of the leader is most imortant in that company's success.
Thus, it may be so that while a particular attribute may not be identified
prior to selection of a leader Us being the most sinele imrortant of a
leader's attributes, in bringing about successful leadership, it mav in
fact be more important than one that was-considered a renuirement or most
important.
From the data obtained in verbal interviews, we see that while most of
the executives said Fisher's biggest contribution was his marketing drive,
Fisher felt it was his ability to manage people. This uestion was hrpsed
to be a historical query, as opposed to "what are Fisher's strengths?"
Indeed, the successful marketing drive may be considered the most
important attribute of Fisher given a particular time span. Over a longer
time frame, because the requirements of the situation may differ, another
attribute may be considered more important. For academic purposes, tis
may suggest that the most imnortant variables in determining successful
leadership must be viewed within a time span by which the"successful
leadership" is dfined. For different time-periods, re-uirenents of
a leader may than vary. This may suzgest that an iortant consideration
in selection fa leader is to look at the duration of tenure thev will
be asked/expected/hoped to maintain their ositions.
On the other hand, a look at the variation in perceptions of
important attributes given different time spans might simply point to
the leadership theories that stress the importance of a fit to
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changing task requirement/- or the importance of being flexible enough
to adapt to changing situations. However, it is possible that leadership
can be thought of in terms of short-term and long-term, the relative
weighting of leader characteristic being different for each. Some
parallel may be drawn to the differentiation Fisher makes between le4ader
and a project manager, the former being the longcterm. the iatte applyff _
to the short term. Still, it must be recognized, although seemingly a-
trite point, that a successful "long-term" leader must he successful in
a series of short terms. For instance, although Ken Fisher is a long-
term leader (i.e., a CFO rather than a project leader) he was still
successful over a series of successive short-term Periods over the past
five years. Again, however, we address the previous discussion and ask
whether it is a worthwhile one for the study of leadership.Argyris points
out that leadership behavior depends primarily upon the situation and not
upon any inherent leadership abilities. This brings to mind the question,
can leadership behavior be separated out from leadership abilit-r
the more overall important variable when addressing the leader as opposed
to the situation. It appears that leadership behavior might be a useful
area for researchers to devote more time to study-as mostresearch
concentrates on the study of "traits" or situation "match".
Bass' study (Section III (A)) which is a summary of leadership
theories and research finding entitled "Managerial Style As a Function of
Personal and Situational Factors",looks at the behavior aspect of
leadership in two general categories: that of being participative or
directive.
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Referring to the tables, we see that in Table 1, attributes of a
leader are cross-analvzed with the tendency of that leader to be
Direct&Ye or Participative. A reminder is that while tbesd cross-
tabulations are descriptive of actual situations, the assurert4 on tt
bass makes is that the tables are actually prescriptive because of a
tendency for the norm to best approximate appropriate behavior.Further
such items as level of esteem and confidence tend to be difficult to
measure, and it is important to realize that this table describes how
and predicts whether a leader will be directive or particitative given
a set of attributes, and does not imply the opposite (i.e., it does not
imply that all participative leaders tend to have low self-confidence and
self-esteem, and that all Directive tend to have high levels). because
these tables represent norms, a helpful way to approach them is to
assume that for a given leader, there is deviation from these norms.
In my case, in this study, it would seem that Fisher was viewed by himself
and his executives as more participative than directive, although Fisher
did ndicate examples that we might view as his assuming a directive stance
(i.e., firing someone immediately if necesspry, confronting P lack of
decision making within the functional areas; noncomnliance with
financial controls.) Fisher seems to fit the Theory Y as oprosed to
Theory X; to highly value subordinate capabilities as opposed to not;
and to believe that participation promotes morale rather than not.
On reagrds to centrality to information, Fisher may be seen tobe
peripheral ( in participative column) rather than central simply
because he allo,s decision-making to be nade within the functional
groups, and as close to the level of implementation within that croup.
In Table 2, we see that where a group is highly cohesive, the leader
tends to be directive rather than participative.
At first consideration, the executive team that works under Fisher
might be seen to be very highly cohesive, as opposed to moderately so.
Executives revealed positive feelings about the on-going teamwork that
takes place. However, moderate cohesion might describe the roup more
approximately, perhaps simply because saclr one represents different
functional orientations, and inherent to their roup identification ma be
different attitudes and purposes. A participative leader may then be seen
to be an inteerator-.of the group. If, on the other hand, the roup
could be considered highly cohesive, due to their cc.-itment to rofit
for instance, then a directive leader may be more appropriate. It is
more realistic that the former is true, however, in the case of Prime.
In looking at other attributes of the subordinates, those hat
imply a participative leader seem to be more applicable for Prime than
those that imply a directive leader. -xecutives say that -they
value effective team-playing, indicating that esteem is mutually sought
among peers rather than from the superior figure. Jobs are of high status
rather than low; time perspective is long-run rather than short-run.
Executives expressed a deep pofessionaL itrestmentn-in 'their :jobs,
that they had consciously "stayed" at Prime or came to Prime because
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they felt they could grow in the positions for quite some time.
Fisher indicated the value of a stable management eam that could
grow together.
Table 3 matches a changing marketplace with a articipative
leader; again, we see Prime within the norm. Fisher stated that the
needs of the company today are different than they were several
years ago, noting the changing marketplace of computers and the
Office of the Future.
Tables 4 and'5, organizational climate-and task requirements
(for executive group),show that most Prime factors fit under the
Participative tendency aso. Thus, in Ken Fisher's assuming a nart-
icpat.ive role, he is, for the mcst part, behaving within the norm of
this model,which would also go on to say that this is what he should do.
Gil's analysis took this situational approach one step further.
he states that leadership behavior is behavioral strteev,understandine
on the leader's part of his or her pla_'e in the organization. This
would emphasize te fact that leadership may indeed be an ability to
understand a given situation, and consciously shape behavior to fit
that situation.. This would not so much focis on particular qualities
of the leader, but wculd imply that a particular quality of the leader
(i.e. perception or adaptability)ould erm.ahle him or her to lead in
almost any situation.
Lawrence and Lorsch lock at this issue, and conclude that a lead-
er's behavior is largely influenced by characteristics of the techno-
logy. Recalling their findings, they concluded that where the tech-
nology was stable and predictable, a traditional structure is best.
The technology at Prime might be considered unpredictable as opposed
to predictable, and the products similar rather than diverse. Prime may
be thought of as centralized, organized around functional groups, and
having a moderately hierarchical structure. Thus, it fits Lawrence and
Lorsch's "stable and predictable" technology-situation rather than te
unpredictable technology and diverse-product situation. One might
then ask if the functional orientation of Prime is appropriate, as a more
de-centralized structure may enable it to be more responsive to the
changing marketplace. However, because Prime's products are similar, it
would seem very possible that a centralized, functionally-oriented
structure would not limit its ability to be both proactive in, and
reactive to, a changing marketlace. This issue may also be seen as
being addressed through the commitment of Fisher to addressing the needs
of the top 15X of the market...the innovators and new users. It would
seem that such a singular focus would compensate for any delays that
might be caused by a company being functionally organized rather tan
being product-oriented and decentralized.
We can easily see how Fisher fills the leadership role as a result
of criteria noted by Jacobs. e notes that the leader usuallv possesses
an unudual level of competence that most roup members do not bhve.
These individuals u ually have this level of competence in an area that
contributes to the attairnment of group goals. In this case, oe might see
Fisher's most noticeable contribution as a marketing-driven leader.
All of Fisher's executives recognize him for this uality, and accord bat
both respect (esteem) and status. I return, he contributes his marketing
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drive.
In analyzing the situation in terms of social exchange theory
as suggested by Jacobs, we note that the roup, in this case, partially
came to Prime, either with Fisher, or shortly after him (i.e., Horton,
Morrill), so that the social exchange process as already in place when
these executives arrived. Hence, they may have begun this process
with Fisher prior to coming to Prime (i.e., regarding him as a leader
to whom they would confer status in exchange for his unique contr;bution).
In any case, Hollander suggested that the emergence of leadershi
requires that one gains visibility and this consolidates ains. One
executive described that the process by which Fisher actually ot his
ideas across was through active co,-unication with the Board nd te
executives. This was his means of gaining visibility, and emer2ing as
a leader, although, in fact, he had already been conferred the leadership
role by the Board of Directors.
Hollander stresses that tis process involves both conforming to
the group's norms, and then making a unique contribution to the attain-
ment of group goals. This can most definitely be seen to describe
Fisher's entrance to Prime, as he stated that while he had to devote
energy to teaching others to lead by direction, rather then by doing, and
to changing the way strategy was formulated. etc..., he spent
considerable time and energy trying to underdtand the reople at Prime
already, and whav was important to them. The unique contribution mv be
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thought of as Fisher's marketing drive, expertise, and vision. JPcobs
contends that the third requirement for successful emergence of a lepder
according to social exchange theory is a bargaining for status end
esteem in exchange for this contri{utio. Although Fisher was in title
CEO and President, he no doubt "bargained" as Jacobs describes, for he
gained the esteem of his subordinates over and above what might be a
minimum amount inherent in the "imposed" aspect of the position.
A useful vehicle for differentiating Fisher as a leader is Jacob's
definition of powter, of authority and of leadership. (See Section III (A))
Fisher's concept and example as the CEO and president of Prime Computer
definitely place him in the "leadership" position, rather than that associated
with just power or just authority. Recalling the chart entitled "Power,
Authority, and Leadership", we can see the communications renuirements,
the consequences of noncompliance, the basis of influence attempt, and the
organizational consequences of each of the three. We can interpret the
chart in the following ways, as a basis for analysis of Prime.
Power may be seen as the capacity to deprive another of needed
satisfactions or benefits, or to inflict costs on one for non-conoliance
with an influence attempt. Comrliance requires observation b the influencine
agent, because the influence target will seek to otair rewards b ulterior
means, if possible, and to avoid punis,~ents by leaving the situation,
whenever able. Implications for organizational effectiveness stem from the
effectiveness of resistance, and the cost of supervision to insure that the
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desired performance occurs. Communication, during an influence attempt
based on power, need not be to-way, and after will not be.
Authority, somewhat similar, "resides in the relationships between
positions in an organization, and is derived from consensually validated
role expectations for the psoition incumbents involved," states Jacobs.
Compliance with authoritative influence attempts is required of the
subordinate; the specified elavior is that which is required for
organizational effectiveness, and is the price raid for organizational
membership. While power does not recuire two-way communication, authority
probably does, Since authority rests on the consensus of subordinates, the
authority figure presumably must communicate sufficient information about
overall objectives so that his subordinates understand not only their obs,
but also his. This is needed in order to obtain their agreement that his
role calls for him to engage in certain influence acts in order to dis-
charge his own responsibilities.
Leadership, on the other hand, can be thought to consist of an
interaction between persons such tat the influence target becomes
convinced that his outcomes (benefits/cost ratio) will be improved
if he behaves as the influence initiator desires. It produces behavior
that is self-motivating, and which therefore requires no supervision for
compliance. Communication skills are more important for leadership than
for either power or authority influence attempts, because its essence is the
development of a new state of knowledge, belief, or attitude in the
influence target. A key requirement for leadership, according to Jacobs,
therefore, is that the influence target probably must alvwvs have the
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option of deciding for or against compliance with the leader's wishes,
without incurring coercive penalties. Fither or both of two kinds of
reward potential probably underlie successful leadership attempts: the
conviction that compliance will produce intrinsic benefits, i.e., the ct
desired by the leader is really best; and second, that the act will
result in social approval of the follower by the leader.
Having already identified Ken Fisher as a participative leader, it
is not too unusual that we might conclude that leadership takes place at
Prime, more so than authority or power. As in any organization, position
power or authority is an inherent part of organizations, especially the
lower in the organizational chart one looks. However, if there was a
category of organizations where the CEO's tended to rely more on
leadership than the other two, Prime would be in this cateo.Ty. This
can be shown by the fact that Fisher attempts to influence his subordinates,
for the most part, by his consistent anproach of leading by direction,
allowing an unlimited reign of responsibility of executives in inter-
preting Fisher's objectives. The built-in limitations of various ositions
cannot be ignored, however, and because of the articular requirements
and limitations that exist between the different levels of uthoritv,
we observe the presence of authority influence, as identified by
Jacobs.
Referring again to Jacob's chart, we might view leadership at
Prime as behavior which succeeds in producing movement towards
goals, without deprivation of esteem satisfactions and without disruption of
the equity of exchange between the worker and the organizations. An
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assumption here is that there is a general dislike for inecuity in exchange
as defined by Jacobs; and that this is a source of contention if it does
occut. Fisher then, influences the executive group by his knowledge of
the market's needs; his ability to envision Prime's future, and his ability
to actually lead--that is--to inspitre, direct, mtivate and to plan.
McC&elland5 2 points out that the evil in power is the potential
for arbitrary application. He states that this is feared by organizations,
and that it is possible that the removal of the sense of arbitrariness
is the key to the effectiveness of participatory leadership techniques long
advocated by human relations theorists.
Adding Jacob's perspective to this, however, would be to aeain
apply the social exchange theory to an understanding of leadership in
formal organizations. This view assumes that participation itself may
not be the key factor. The social exchange theory would say tht the key
factor is probably effective representation of the organizational
member, to insure that the equity of his outcomes is not compromised by
the arbitrzry actions of his own superordirntes. This might also
be thought of as similar to Mcfurray's "benevolent autocracy."
Jacob's point that "true" leadership actually is difficult to
find in many formal organizations because it is not cost-effective is an
interesting one to consider in the context of Prime. Persuasive
interaction, which is the tool used to change attitudes and beliefs,is
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difficult and time-consuming. When we look at the situation at Prime,
Fisher explained how he spent a good deal of his early days both listening
to others, and cormunicating his ideas to them, on such topics as a
marketing orientation, development of strategy, etc.. He noted that the
organization was "ready for change" and quite willing to do so. Perhaps
because of the organization's readiness to change, the "persuasion"
period, as defined by Jacobs, was not as time-consuming as otherwise
might have been. Perhaps the next most significant act of leadership
in which Fisher may have had to persuade attitudes and beliefs of his
subordinates was the decision to enter the office of te Future mrket.
This represented development of new roduct:' aeas as opposed
to previous decisions which were predominantly to exploit new markets
with existing proucts. An interesting "test" of a "threshold" where
leadership beceones authority or power (as in Jacob's definition) due to the
constraints of time and/or organizational pressure might be to cona-re
the behavior of Fisher when he initially introduced the rarketing orient-
ation and the appropriate changes, with his decision to enter the Office
of the Future market. This kind of comparison brings to mind an
empirical question, One wonders whether leadership, as defined by
Jacobs, can consistently prevail in an organization, or whether, due to
constraints imposed by formal organizations, and due to the fact that they
are organized around the attainment of oals, leadership must occasinallv
yield to use of authority and/or power. To determine whether "leadership"
was able to prevail rather than "authority" or "power" in Fisher's Office
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of the Future, decision, we might revert back to ollander's fist of
effectiveness of leadership. That is, we can lock at te degree of
acceptance of this influence of Fisher's. It appears, from discussions
with executives, that this was seen as a maturation of the same mrketine
drive that Fisher injected into the comnranv when he first cre. Thus, it
appears that Ken Fisher's leadership has been perceived as consistent
throughout. Because the hypothetical "threshold" which one would pass
over into use of authority and power was not crossed, we cannot determine
the sequence of events that occur from this example. Critical in
observing an example of this would be, however, to determine whether the
leader consciously or unconsciously changed his mode of comnunication,
two way to one way for instance , or whether he or she changed the basis
of influence attemnt first. The former case might indicate a shift
in the leadership relationship (with subordinates and situation) and might
warrant an organizational remedy to help maintain leadership. The latter
might indicate a shift in the orientation of the 'eader himself or herself,
warranting a change in leadership behavior. Threats to sel(-esteem, or
perhaps '"lack of time" might be reasons for behavior based solely on
position power.
Fisher's influence as a leader can more simply be addressed by using
Hempgill's distinction between "attempted leadership" and the "leadershir
act", He simply states tt "attempted leadership" is any initiation
of new structure; the "leadership act" occurs when that initiation is
accepted.
He described '*maintenance" of leadership as being affected by the
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working relationships affected by the assertions of power. The decree
of initiation by a leader is significantly raised or lowered by the
acceptabce that a person is led to believe he has. Fisher apeared
to have widespread support upon his arrival at Prime--both from the
Board and his executive team (although some came with Fisher). e
initiated a new marketing focus; a buildup of the sales force and
distribution channels; a commitment o profits; internal funding of
growth; and a policy of "controlled growth" by limiting the number of
hires in the late 70's to isnure quality of personnel; amone other
things. Specifically, he focused markets on end users rather than OEM,
but then came back to OEM for about 15% of sales, began working with
software houses; then, started directing resources to the Cffice of
the Future market. ore recently, he initiated a continued commitment
to the functional structure, and he also initiated an effort to look at
possible new venture opportunities that might be attractive to Prime to
include under their corporate umbrellas. istcrically, it aprears that
Fisher may have initiated more when he first came rather than later.
There may be several reasons to explain this, however, one simply being
that tere is less to cange now, especially if existing plans are oing
smoothly.
Hollander points out that once having achieved status of high
influence, a leader must not fit past exnectations, but new ones, which
arise as the situation inevitably is altered. Fisber's statement
that the "needs of the companyare different now"' sea to the definition
of a leader being able to be aware of and adopt to new situations.
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Fisher's choice to position himself as a "conceptual" leader in the
company and industry enables him to act in a responsive and receptive
mode to innovative ideas, and frees him to envision future events.
Fisher has a commitment to anticipating future market nd company needs.
He is also refined in approach in terms of learning from the ep:erience
of other similar young high-technology firms, as shown by his conscious
decision to vontrol growth. Although praised as F"marging growth', it is
possible that this may have been viewed by some as a retreat from
initiative (if they expected initiative with unlimited growth, for example),
simply because it was a change from the aggressive growth of earlier years.
However, this.change was a conscious one, on the part of Ken Fisher, to
insure that a hieh level of quality remained in personnel.
A question that emerges from discussion of the ability of a leader
to attain leadership status, to maintain it, and to reserve a lexibilitv
to adapt to new and chanting demands, is the following. ow important is
leadership experience and/or training in determining the effectiveness
of that leader? This is a particularly relevant issue for this case, as
Fisher may be thought of as the trained and experienced roressionl
uanager/leader; the former CO, on the other hand, may be thought of as
an engineer/entrepreneur, a leader in F&D. This is an interesting
point also from the perspective that still relatively few mereing
high-technology corporations have anyone but an engineer in the CEO's
position. Indeed, implicit in the postulations of ¥cGregor, Fiedler and
Argyris that leadership is a situational phenomenon is the asstnption that
effective leadership depends on the situation. Thus, the experienced
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leader will have had more dealings with a variety of situations, which one
would assume would make that leader more effective in any given situation.
Fiedler and t;oka 52 (1975) point out, however, that no rerorted research
related leadership experience to organizational performance. Scion and
Benis53 point out that leadership training does bring about some chanees in
behavior.
The question arises, then, as brought up by House54 and Underwood5 5
and others...wby does training or experience fail to result in better
performance? It is useful to look briefly at Fiedler's Contingency Model56
to understand Fiedler's answer to this question. It postulates that
the group's performance is contingent upon two interacting variables.These
are (a) the degree to which the leader is asically motivated to relate
to members of his group or to achieve task success, and (b) the degree to
which the leadership situation is favorable, i.e., to which it enables the
leader to exert power and influence. Only in favorable situations will
relationship-motivated leaders manifest behavior concerned with relatinp
to group members while the task-motivated leaders will manifest behaviors
concerned with the task. osever, in very favorable situations in which
the leader is accepted, in which he has osition power, and in which the
task is strtctured, e can 'afford' to seek secondary oals since his
primary goals are essentially secured. The relationship-oriented
leader seels self-enhancement and rominence while the task-oriented
57leader looks for pleasant interpersonal relations.
Fiedler contends that the trained leader will have solutions
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Favourableness of the Situation
Very Intermediately Not
favourable favourable favourpble
Relation-
ship ;oor Good Poor
znotivated performance performance Performance
leaders 
Task Good Poor Good
Ibtiv- performance performance Performance
sated
Lkaders
Arrows predicted effect of experience and training.
Hypothesized Effect of Leader Experience and Training as Improving
the Faborableness of t Situation.
for many situations which arise. he task will be more structured and
the leader will have more 'expert power', However, the Contineency
Model predicts that improving the leader's situational fvorhbleness ill
have mixed consequences on his performance. Training wtill improve the
task structure and the leader-member relations. This improvement will
result in the leader finding himself in a new situation which is 'rigtt'
for some and not necessarily 'right' for the leadership style of others.
58Thus, he contends performance will also vary,
Fiedler concludes that increased training i detrimental for certain
types of leaders, as the model shows above.
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This helps to explain the feelings that leadership training and
experience does not result in accoss-the board improvement in leaders'
performance. In effect previous leadership experience and training hve
failed to produce the desired results because the positive and negative
effects cancelled each other out.
Applying the chart to the case at Prime, we first note that for a iven
situation, if the situation implies good perfornance for the relationship-
oriented leader, it implies poor performance for the task-oriented
leader, and vice-versa. We might think of te situation at Prime hefore
1975 as unfavorable, since losses were accumulating raridly. Ho-ever,
it is difficult to determine the caustlLeleents and those of
effect of those causes. Because of the ertrepreneur/engineern£ orient-
ation of the former CrO, he might be categorized as more task-motivated
rather than relationship-motivated. The opposite would be true for Fisher.
In this view, we might see the situation pre-1975 at Prime to be
Intermediately favorable, since this is here Fisher would show "good
performance" and the former CEO "poor performance".An accepted leader,
structured task, and high position power of the leader represent a very
favorable situation; the opposite-not favorable. Since the task at hand
at Prime might have been considered unstructured, (with accepted
leader and high-position power) again, we find this combination of
variables in the intermediately favorable situation. This method of
presentation of variables, then, precludes any manipulation of te
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environment that may be the result of the leader, but isolates te vriables
prior to their influence, and then, predicts the nature of their influence.
The deeper issue in this is the cuestion that -asks--does ocd er-
formance move one towards a more favorable situation? Does leader
move him or herself by good performance into a situation in which they
themselves are less able to perform well? Or does the leader rerretuate
his or her position by shaping the environment so that hs or her
performance stays ood relative to the environrmrnt, although c6iistraining
the envirorrent from becoming even more favorable.
This brings up the issue of time span in terms of looking at leader-
ship effectiveness, and also, the situational aspects of leadership
(again). One can ask which is better for the organization,
better leadership perormance, or more favorable situation (higher task
structure, more accepted leader, higher position power). Gils' concept
of behavioral strategy being desi2ned in a network of complex factors
in the organization mitt; predict that the leader will choose the best
mix for the orzanization. Because this is a dynamic situation, tis might
even indicate that a particular leader makes a situation less fvorable
for his own performance, but that his behaviors helD the coemany
to progress. It is possible that this type of model partially explains
natural evolution of leader succession in which a situational "fit" is
determined by a major parameter--that of the prior situation.
Bavelas' definition of leadership would imply an interchangeability
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of leadership personnel, but only on the assumption that each one
would fulfill the same task requirements. Thus, in the case at Prime,
the CEO under study is the second one for Prime, founded in 1972.
Because these two leaders fulfilled very different task requirements,
their degree of interchangeability is quite limited. ut,,Fisher might
be considered interchangeable with any given number of persons who
might likewise see it fit to fulfill the same categories of tsk rePuire-
ments. This perspective would reduce the process and "phenomenon"
aspects of leadership to a secondary consideration, and would elevate the
importance of content of leadership, or leadership actions as demron-
strated relative to tasks required.
Indeed the AYA (American Management Associ=tion) observes that most
CEO's behave within a general set of predictable behaviors, all of which
involve either planning, leading, or monitoring. To plan,he must decide
what to do. This is setting strategy for the company and his role.
To lead, he must get things done through others. To monitor, he senses
and evaluates that which relates to both planning and leading, inside and
outside the firm. A CEO might be considered interchaneable to the
degree that someone else would behave such as to fulfill these duties.
r A CEO might be considered effective to the degree that his influence is
accepted. Finally, a CO might be considered successful if
certain company objectives such as sales, profit, growth, etc..ere et.
To attain the level of successful leadership status as a CEO, for
instance, one must initially be aware of the needs/task requirements of
the position; one must be able to convince others that he or she is
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capable of doing so; and one must demonstrate skill in filling these re-
quirements. Thus, there can be seen distinct elements of the leadership
role that is evident through a kind of sequential emergence, that of
awareness, influence and skill. These elements can be identified as (1)
a cognitive process (2) a conscious-manipulative process, and (3 a
demonstrative process (which may be through others). Fisher perceived
the problems at Prime, as eplained both by himself and his executives,
"before he ca;e." He spent "a great deal of time and effort" convincing
others of his ideas; Hollander's concept of an opportunity for visibility.
Finally, he demonstrated his skill through the actions he and others
by his delegation and/or direction performed.
Finally, Fisher's practices as CO of Prime appear to fit in with
general practices of many rtC's as described by AA studies of ten.
They point out that general practices of CEO's are to delegate "recurring
tasks", follow a policy of noninterference in functional reas, counsel
subordinates, but not to make their decisions. Unicue tasks erformed
by the CFO are also setting the philosophy, objectives ard strategic
plans of the company. Fisher's description of the former CEO pnro-chinq
his job as a "project leader" (i.e., as a result of his involvement in
the tasks implicit in a start-up company) might simply indicate he did
not possess the desire and/or awareness to assume the different tasks
of the (CO relative to a project leader, both preceding influence and
skill.
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STRATFCY 1FC'AtTION, GC;(IL STTI A DFCSION.AKTIN
There is little oubt that Fisher communicates strategy and goals
very much in the way that uinn describes. Fxecutives described his
actions as defining broad objectives, and then responding to ideas that
"bubble up" as a result. He is said to try to "accelerate" this process
through encouragement and receptivity; he is obviously more recentive
to the ideas that make most sense to him.
Clearly it can be seen that the few goals Fisher does announce a
specific rather than as broad objectives are intended to either build
consensus, be broad enough to allow flexibility and opoortunism, and to
be sufficiently distant in time so that several possible options coulr
ensure their achievement.
For instance, while a broad objective/purpose of the company is to
"make money for the shareholders", Fisher's announced goal is that the
company will be a billion dollar ccmpany by the 190's. inn states that
in setting organization goals, while they must be general enough to gain
widespread support, they must clearly delineate what distinguishes the
"us" from "them".
Whether for motivational or just for competitive marketing reasons,
Prime differentiates itself on issues like unmatched service and
distribution capabilities ah-t in the office automation area, a unique
approreach tailored to executives rather than secretaries. This is one
of the more recent focuses of the ompany to not only be market
driven, but to be responsive to the "front end" of the market in
particular, the innovators and early adapters, as commonly ideTttified
in product "adoption" curves.
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While Fisher does set broad objectives,it is also obvious that he
employs Quinn's'"logical incrementation')in that he responds to well-
thought out ideas and propo.als of others.Because interpretation of
these objectives will again be the job of the functional leaders,
for instance,Fisher's consistent stance as the conceptual leader who
responds to well-documented ideas makes it more likely that the pro-.
posers will identify and follow through with their propositions. This.
is the flexibility hat Prime is trying to develop in responding also- .
to new opportunities,as one executive emphasized. e referred t the..
fact that this was recently being considered at several levels in the .
organization,so, if a particular person might see an opportunity for
Prime to join in a new venture of some sort,that person would be iden..
tified with and expected to follow their proposal through contribution -
to goal setting and perhaps through to implementation.
It is unclear that Prime has a broad goal that creates identity
and "eian"that Ouinn refers to finding in several companies."To make
money for the"'shareholders"is not likely to be considered a "transcen-
dant"goal that is to become the basis of a movement or cause,or one
in which articulation f it will induce a moral rightness of the goal.
It is possible,though,that this is characteristic of young companies;
an implicit "transcendant"gcal is that of"free enterprise",anHe effort
to achieve recognition based on value of contribution. The articulation
of Prime's goals does appear to be becoming more refined as the
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company grows. Its executives talk of its having "the hest" sles and
distribution teams; its Office Automation products are "like no other",
and offer an "integrated approach". Prime's unique approach to Office
Automation, tackling executive productivity rather than clerical,wps
an example of what Quinn describes as the challenge that effective
goal-setting can accomplish during a time of "major change from the
past." To be effective, Quinn states they must build on accented
values in the organization. Thus, while Prime had been turning
around to become market-oriented, oals were still set, based on
accepted values in the company, namely, aggressive and innovative
engineering. Fisher explained, for instance, how the Office Auto-
maticn system was a "natural extension of the comnanv's roduct
evolution". He spoke of the difference between Prime's integrated
system, and other companies' partial solutions. "Other vendors in
this market began by first developing word processing and electronic
mail software, but have only extended tt roduct with limited
data storage and retrieval capabilities," he was aucted in an
April 1980 "Computer Systems ews". "Prime has built its success
on the difficult parts: mainframe level data processing, networking,
communications, and data base capabilities. Adding word rocessing
and electronic mail functioning was much less difficult," Fisher
was also quoted. In some sense, Fisher is able to utilize his
press and publicity to serve an important purpose for the company.
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Shils pointed out that opportunity to articulate a transcendent goal
is one of the situational requirements for a person to have
charismatic effects. Fisber's identification of Prime as an
innovative and aggressive leader in this market is a way to rovide
meaning and generate excitement for a "shared vision of what
could be" as described by Berlew. Such a common vision reflects
goals in a future-state of affairs that is valued by the oregnization's
members, and thus important for them to bring about. As mentioned,
the expression of a future state of affairs for Prime usually
focuses on a revenue objective, although Prime is identifying its
mission as providing an "integrated approach", etc., which connote
values of anticipation of human needs in the future, quality work
and thoughtful work. The transcendent goal, then, might be thought
of as "anticipating human needs in comrunication in the future."
Quinn also points out that in addition to building conseasus
around a broad goal, a top executive can make selected goals
explicit at the proper moment, to create a challenge or to cry-
stallize a defined thrust. At the time when Fiisher as building
the marketing organization up from the ground, he made explicit
the goal that Prime would address the end user markets instead
of the L'F!'s. y so doing, he was able to provide voung and
growing sales and distribution force with a sharp, new focus.
The type of decision-making that eckard advocates, that in
which decisions are made by and near the sources of information,
regardless of where these sources are located, appears to he
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integral to Fisher's leadership style. Executives within unctional
Jrcups explained how their own leaderahips wre affected by Ken
Fisher's style of decision-making. They said they, too, tended to
delegate more and to push decision-making down as close as possible
to the level of implementation. One executive asserted that he
had control, but it as now through others that he had this
control. He maintained tat in assuming his leadership position
as a functional leader, he had to be willing to give up absolute
decision-making, as one might expect is possible for an entre-
preneur or a project manager. A corporate leader must be willing
to orchestrate decisions through others. tie maintained that this
was possible for him to implement because of the latitude
in interpretation of objectives and decision-making that Fisher
enabled him to have.
Fisher maintains that functional decisions should be made
within the functional groups, decisions that cross functional
areas should involve more functional groups. This is the kind
of decision he said he is more apt to be involved in, and obviously
so, if the matter is o corporate-wide significance. uorporate
Development was set up by isher, one of whose objectives
was to facilitate and help to integrate cross-functional decision-
making if an integrator role was needed. albraith6 1 might refer
to this intervention as a "creation of lateral relations." While
somewhat short of establisrhment of a "matrix" form, this may be
thought of as the creation of a liaison role or of an ntegrtini
role. Galbraith's listing of them in sequence, determined by
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increasing ability to handle information an cost to the organization,
is useful to eamine hre.
1.Direct contact between managers
2.creation of liaison role
3.ureation of task forces
4.Use of teams
5.Creation of integrating role
6.Change to rarnagerial linking role
7.Estabiishment of the matrix form
Fisher is ccmmitted to a functional orientation, which, accord-
ing to organization theories of albraith and Lawrence and Lorscn,62
is appropriate considering the fact that there are not numerous
extremely diverse products. Galbrditn explains that the use of
lateral relations permits the organization to make more decisions
and process more information without overloading hierarchical
communication cannels. hile differentiation as described by
Lawrence and Lorsch to be"t..the difference in cgnitive and
emotional orientation among managers in different functional
departments.") is associated with effective subtask performance,
Galbraith contends that it is also associated with difficulty in
establishing collaboration between dtterentiated departments.
Thus, the need for the integrator role, not to make the best
decision, but to see that the best decision gets made.
Fisher's decision-making stle closely resemrbies that
advocated by iseckhard, Calbraitn, Lawrence and Lorscn, and his
strategy-formulation methods closely resembles that of Ouinn's
"logical increr.entation", given the stage dn corporate growth
and size of Prime.
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ANALYSIS C A CORPCPATF TANFVITICN: FROM A TFCN.;T .AL OR!FNTATION
TO A R P.K T RIF.TATION
Fisher appears to fit the model that hollander describes in
speaking about one form of emergent leaderstip. For a change to
be instigated, noilander asserts that there must be a comparison
between things as they are and things as they might be. he implies
that one way this can happen is through interjection of an
appropriate outside influence. This is the same process that
Menzel and Katz refer to as when "the leader is found to be a
person who provides an interpretation of the wogld outside to
the immediate group."
It might also seem to follow, then, that a very rpropripte
time for an organization to change would be exactly when a new
leader is "imposed"; using io&lander's terminology, since there
is a change implicit with the introduction of a new leader. Menzel
and Katz describe this process as one in which the new leader can
convey structure in terms of a "social reality" and can encourage
an acceptance of innovation. It is interesti g to note that
while Fisher represented this new leader from te outside world,
the associated willingness to undertake change was no doubt
aided by the fact that some of the top executives were also from
the same "outside world" as far as Prime was concerned; i.e., omer
came from tocnevwell as did Fisher. In view of the rartiallv
inherent willingness and readiness to cange, accentuated bv the
fact that some key people were just beginning at Prime and therefore
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would not be particularly threatened by a change, the transition
period at Prime was possibly more of an evolution itself, rather
than a revolution.
It is helpful to try to understand the dynamics of this
change period, however, which Beckhatd clearly defines. He
primarily points cut that one of the ey conditions that must be
true for real organizational change to take place is that there
must be a real dissatisfaction with the status quo-hig- enough
so that energy can be mobilized toward some chngne. Clearlv, this
energy was evident at Prime before Fisher came, as it mobilized
the oard to search for a new leader--a marieetine-oriented one.
This energy, though, might be thought of as having been focused
on the search for a new leader rather than the potentially more
difficult task of charging the internal values and organizational
goals. nere we can address the issue of the "domino effect"
identified by Beckhard as occuring in a change process, once the
initial steps in managing that change are recognized.
For instance, part o the successful change process can
be seen to be attributable to the Board's recognition of a need
for the leader to manage the change. Because this key ster was
identified, internal development of the goals and strategies
might have been easier than if not.
Referring back to Beckhard's theory, it is clear that the
leader, in this case, had a clear picture of a desired state
which could be worth mobiliTing a change toward . Fisher's
7
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desired state" may have. been considered his vision of Prime
reaching the billion dollar mark in sales by &990O It also
may be considered the general excellent quality and servicing.
Regarding the leader's having a picture of some practical
first step, Fisher spoke of refining the way people developed
strategy, and said he tried to get people to ask the "what"
question rather than just the "how" question. This intervention
enabled them to see that they were not fully exploiting the opor-
tunities of the marketplace; as te "what" they were oing had
not been examined from a strategic point of view. As a result,
the company shifted focus from the CEE markret to te end users,
a major shift which began a series of "domino effect" (i.e.,
the company became "market-oriented" rather than technologically or
even product driven; people began to be rewarded to "think
strategically").
Thus, it is easy to see that te tree basic requirements for
a change to occur (such that the economic and emotional "cost" was
not too high), were present in the Prime transition. Since Beck-
hard describes these requirements as being essential for a cnsultant's
facilitation of change, it would be implied that their rresence in
a transition-stage company wouid be even more of a vehicle for
'change for a new leader.
This is perhaps one of the more basic issues to explore
in terms of the successful transition that tork place at Prime,
that is, the issue of a new leader, as part of a transition period
for the company.
According to Teulineos and Otter's model of leadership success-
ion and recruitment, Fisher might be considered the "outsider'". One
of the three hypotheses they found to be true was that the lwer
the level of organizational performance, the higher the chance of
recruitment for "outsiders" and "strong men" as successors. This
is explained by Teulings and Otter to be de to a positive
incentive to look out.ard for what was not found inside the organ-
ization; a kind of "savior" search. This explanation fits the Prime
case well. Their results also lend insight into the transition t
Prime in a slightly less direct, but primarily meaningful wav.
Perhaps because organizations that have strong integrative systems
(indicated by a proliferation of rules and regulations and hier
archization) are more vulnerable to the disruptive consequences
of a change in leadership, it would be implied that a more iocsely
integrated organization would be less vulnerable, and there would be
fewer requirer.ents for co-crdinative action by the leader. Another
result that proved that the higher the level of organizational
performance, the higher the chances of interpersonal tension
coupled with the succession process could be applied to te Prime
case in the reverse. ecause Prime was not successful prior to
Fisher, the chances of interpersonal tension were lower. One
noticeable factor in the change-in-leadershin process t Prime was
that there was a supportive executive groun. while a few of these
came directly from Horeywell as former associates of Fisher, two of
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original founders stayed at Prime, and were uite supportive of hin,.
One key executive did leave Prime to start vet another company; he
did not want to make the changes that the other executives saw so
integral in shifting from an entrepreneurial organization to a for-
mal corporation. Thus, it was interesting to see that potential
conflicts in terms of company style and direction were perhaps
obviated tcfply by Fisher's arrival, That is,
those that were willing to assume the style of leaderhip required
in a formal organization stayed at Prime, since this was the direction
that Fisher decided to move the company towards. !hile not emerging
as an extremely bureaucratic leader, Fisher seemed to inject a
professioral and corporate, yet simple structure on the conpany. It
was no longer a "start-up". Thus, it is an interesting proposition
that a new leader may make the natural evolution from a start-up
phase to the emerging corporation phase easier. It would seem to
clarify the change process in that many of the chances, while
naturally evolving, could still be attributed to the influence of
the new leader. Thus, those in the company in transition are erhars
more able to make a conscious decision as to whether they want to
adapt to the change. Vithout the new leader, the organization it-
self is more likely to be perceived as the sole "cause" of change,
thereby making it more confusing to differentiate between the "new"
and "old" organization for the person immersed in it. In any case,
the researchers assert hat the organization conditions prior to
the change in leadership have a greater impact on the
course of events than the selective recruitment itself. In the
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case of Prime, then, this could be interpreted t suggest that the
unsuccessful condition of the company predisposed the results of the
introduction of any leader (perhaps within a reasonable range) to
be successful, although perhaps to varying degrees. owever, this
argument only has limited significance since "impact" can be both
favorable and unfavorable (i.e., while pre-change conditions as
identified in this model may be seen to influence the results of a
change in leadership, this influence or impact is not necessarily
favorable.) On the other hand, the presence of the variles
associated with the leader (i.e., marketing backcoround, leadership
experience, etc.) may be thought of as more indicative of a favorable
outcome. Thus, an objective in lanning a cane in leadershir would
be not only to be aware of the most influential factors, but also, the
most avorable influential factors. This would enable that a discern-
ing look could be taken to identify what elements (organizational or
those associated with the new leader) might be anipulated to achieve
the optiral "synergy" between the tt.
Teulings and Ctter, indeed, found that the "outsider" and "strong
man"are effective change agents, but that their role is limited. The
claim that they introduce change only where the previous
situation was such as to makie a change very likely (i.e., low bureau-
cratization to high bureaucratization) can be directly anlied to
Prime. Prime had a product hose functionality and whose arlets
were not being fully exploited; it had a technological orientation
at a time when companies and particularly, high-tech companies,
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were realizing the value of a customer-oriented philosophy; and it was
small, unprofitable and lacked strategic focus. Again, we recall
the interview data in which various executives supported the fact
that many other leaders would have assumed similar actions as Fisher.
They all strongly contended,however, that Fisher's unique contribu-
tions of a very aggressive marketing drive coupled with a commitment
to profits, as well as his ability to manage people such as to en-
courage their own development, were what made Prime as successful as
it is now. Thus, these executives would tend to disagree with the
findings of Teulings and Otter that the succession itself is probably
of more consequence than who succeeds, particularly if some measure
could be included to attribute the results of "unique" contributions
to the leader, and those of some "expected average" to the succession
process. TIfdustry spokesman talked of his unique contributions
as being financial control and controlled rowth. No doubt, the
)enaomeaon they identified as antic ipatory reorganization is somewhat
complicated in that not all of those that adjusted to te new
successor were in the company. Several caime from former associates
with Fisher; hundreds were hired in short periods of time (grew from
100 in 1975 to over 2,500 in 1980). While the conditions of this
case are unique, research that addressed the issues of Teulins and
Otter more specifically to very young corporations might exnlain more
of the influence of particular situational variables.
In looking at the specific nature of the direction of organ-
ization change, we can see that Ryan's assertions of the role of the
t;ED) in a marketing-oriented company hold true for Fisher. While
one executive said that Fisher makes a point not to become any
more involved in the marketing functional area than he does in the
others, he is able to assume the stance of marketing leader for
.the company in that he makes sure all planning is marketing
oriented, and that all ideas are relevant to market needs. In no
way is Fisher seen to only partially fulfill this role; his carge
of the- market strategy, build-lip of the marketing force, and his
philosophical and conceptual focus on marketing give evidence to
t.is assumption that his marketing leadership is integral to his
being EO.
Finally, in addressing the consistency and compensatory models
as suggested by Evans an.~ Kerr, the leadership contingence model at
Prime might be seer. to be that of a compensatory model, where the
functional grous have a healthy interaction, each one differenti-
ated by its functional orientation. Kerr found that a compenstory
framework sas more ppropriate in a less complex, hierarchical
design, as Prime could be considered. One leadershin style is
thought to compensate for a deficiency in another;and different
leadership styles are thought to be appropriate at different hier-
archical levels. At Prime, this is displayed by the increpsing
degree of a conceptual leadership orientation, a leading by direction,
as one goes up the organization chart. Th:s, while the leadership
styles are seen to be somewhat consistent within levels, they are
more complementary across levels. Supportive of what is found at
Prime, also, then; are the findings of Lawrence and Iorsch,
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which state that similar leadership styles are only effective
in very complex organization designs. To refine the analysis of the
conguence-issue at Prime, use of the Uhio Btate scales
differentiates between leadershin style congruence and leadership
congruence, or, rather, the process and reward compoeents. The
process component at Prime, then, may be seen to include varying
degrees of participative and directive, altbougn the majority of
leadership style tends to be participative. he reward component,
on the other hand, appears to be more consistent. At Prime, the
consistent reward seems to be through increasing responsibility and
the less direct reward of stock options.
Research has brought out contiicting conclusions in terrs of
consequence-effectiveness tests; neaiey and 'iedler feel that hier-
archical incongruence was more favorable to leadership effectiveness
that hierarcnical congruence; Osborn and Hunt found the opposite.
Interestingly enough, examination of the Prime case will make us
tend to find the results of !Healey and Fiedler and Kerr. e see
that as Prime becomes slightly more complex, the need to integrate
leadership behavior of different leaders becomes more necessary.
Thus, while a variety of leadership styles has been effective
during Prime's simple functioral-organizatioral structure, the need
for leadership consistency has become more necessary as the
organization grows more complex, although it is no doubt doing
so gradually.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A change in leadership was one of the major elements of a
transition period at Prime Computer. Some of the ma.or goals that
Fisher achieved, using terminology of Beckhard's research on
organization change, are the following:
1.Change the organization culture
(entrepreneurially-oriented to professionally.
managed; technologically driven to market-driven)
2.Changing the managerial strategy
(project-management to leadership by direction;
entrepreneurs to executive teams)
3.changing the fway work is' done
(redistribute the work so that decisions are made
at the lowest possible levels)
Thus, we can see that Fisher, as a leader of Prime, assumed
the role of a change agent to some extent, as his actions are those
identified by Beckhard as such. We can find support for his assuiping
_ emajor role in the marketing planning at Prime in the literature:
we can also find support for his objectives of maintainin a
functional orientation, while introducing an integrator role; and
for his attempts to "hire to complement". His method of devising
strategy is supported in Quinn's "logical incrementalism", as well
as in other research. The perceptions of both Fisher and his
executives appear to be that while the "situational" explanation
(ice, relating to functions performed)Of leadership is realistic,
it is not sufficient. Even less sufficient is a simple leader-
attribution theory.
-98-
As recognized by Galbraith in an excerpt at the beginning of
this paper, little of the variance of a behavior or attitude in
leadership has been explained by the research.
The perceptions and statements elicited from Fisher and his
executives do seem to favor some theories more so than others. They
would probably ascribe most to Hollander's concept of emergent
leadership and Jacob's use of social exchange theory.
Implicit, but not directly addressed in these theories, are
some issues that deserve more research focus. They appear to be
very subtle but important behaviors of a leader that Fisher and
his executives seem to assume. They are:
.Awareness that leadership is a distinct role one can
consciously assume.
.Desire to be a leader is important.
.Desire to maintain leadership is important.
.Follower-perception that one is a leader is important.
.Some degree of "'consistency" can he detected by followers.
This may be considered "'style".
These are all characteristics of Ken Fisher that the executives
expressed they saw. While they are not attributes per se, they are
not very obvious behaviors, but rather subtle ones. hey address
leadership i a cognitivd, emotional and rational way(awareness of
being a leader;desire to be a leader;ability to maintain leader-
ship). The detection of consistency also can be thought of to
loosely refer to time-span, a consideration that this paper addressed
previously. A leader is defined by the time-span he or she is able
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to maintain a consistent approach. This is not meant to imply that
a leader could not modify his or ner style when needed. Our review
of the literature in tact told us otherwise. What it does mean is
that the core ot the leader, perhaps being ccmposed of awareness,
desire and ability to be a leader, must continuallv be perceived by the
followers. In this sense, these hypotheses approach Hollander's
emergent theory of leadership, where more importance is placed on
the followers than the situation. The ocial Fxchange Theory also
speaks to the process that occ,rs, that is, the exchange of rewards
between leader and follower. xecutives at Prime might also be seen
to having most supported not only the process implied by Hoilander's
emergent theory of leadership, but also y te Sociai Fxchane
Theory. Executives exchange their ability to assume increasing
responsibility with Fisher, who in teturn, is allowed by them to lead
by direction, as they give teir implicit agreement t follow.
The data in this case, therefore, most strongly supports these
two theories.
Much research is still needed to be done, although there is a pro-
liferation of leadership research and theory. There is little research
on the causes of particular leadership behavior. Situational and
attribute rodels do rot appear to be suffici.nt. Fisher asserted that
when asked if he shared the situation to him, so that he might be
able to lead, or whether he shaped himself to the situation,he
answered the former. "That's what you do", he said simply,
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referring to "how" one leads. This data would suggest that te
leader is, in tact, muc morcre the focal point o the leadership
phenomera than current literature suggests. Aain, this does
not suggest a simple trait thecry; nor does it minimize the
importance of situational models; it does, however, suggest that
little is lkr.wn about the process tat occurs within te leader
himself or herself, that wh.ich is also perceived by followerso
As just stated, these processes are seen to be conscious efforts
on the part of the leader. A leader must be aware of their role
and the phenomenon of leadership as being real; they must
desire it; t.ey must k.nw how to execute it; they must be erceived
as such (ioeo, possessing consistercy). '-r some sense,not or.iy
do the two theories mentioned most closely addresx this pnencmenon
as an active,conscious process,in some respect, wThat has beer
identified as charisma" in the literature may also be seen to be
important. Yet, a new lock must De taken at charisma. It must
also be addressed in te literature as an active.conscious
process on tne part ot the leader, a willing ehavloro Such focus
on te will of the person identified as leader ray effect
a shitt in eadership research. This shift nilht very well be
welcome; it is an often-heard conlaint tr.at even sitiational
-101-
models are not definitive in explaining leadership, as they can
never explain every situatioen or incorporate every variable.
On the other hand, trait cheories can never "explain" every
person. The to theories identified and hypotheses of
leadership suggested in tnis suinary do speak about process,
Applicable in any situation where there is a leader and
followers. No doubt leadership theorists were correct in
rejecting the earlier day trait theories that were simplistic
and of limited use; the trend towards a situaticonal approach
was much more realistic. What is being seen now, however, and
supported b tis case, is a ereral dissatisfaction with
situational models also, ecause ot their limited ;nlicabilitv
in particular. This paper suggests and concludes that attention
must again e focused r. the leader, bt not in te criiral
"trait" type of approach. Ratner, the conscious willinr.ess
to be a leader must be examined as a behavioral process.
Once this is done, other issues relating to ledersh ip
should fall out more naturally. Fcr instance, the "whys" hehind
particular acticn mnight be rre easily attributable to a
to a perception of the fundamentally "cortrect" thing to do in a
situation. btivatior.,etc. .will have areadv been addressed in
the topic of the leader as a person wTho consciously assumes 'r.his or
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her position. Thus, effective or nor.effective leadership mignt e
more easily studied; e.g., problems mignt be ddressed to either a
lacking in the decision element ot asstuming ieadersFip, or, in the
action element ot it. Such issues as setting strategy, decision-
making, and management of change might also be more easily studied if
situational elements can be considered factors in these tasks rather
than causes ot them. he empirical question ot wnether success in an
organization might be due to a leader, a chane in leadership,
or to the situation, might be answered, despite the fact that it is
virtually impossible to exactly duplicate a particular leadersh&p
situation. The process of leadership, then, as that ot within the
leader and perceived by followers, can be made distinct trcm
results ot leadership and situational factors of those results.
What was most evident, from this case study of en isher at
Prime Computer, was the ccnscious decision, on his art, to assume
the role of leader. what appears to be mncst missing in the
literature on leadership is recognition of this as an integral if
not the integral essence of the phenormenon of leadership. Finallv,
while it is conceivable to thinK tnat tnis conclusion could be arrived
at from other case studies, this author recommenas urther case
studies to validate tis tinding, in an effort to progress towards
a definitive leadership theory.
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